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P re fa ce

The purpose of this paper is to offer an interpretation of the Reich's
involvement inSoutheastern Europe from 1933 to the capituation of Yugoslavia
and Greece in 1941.
in distinct stages.

It illustrates the method of German penetration as it occuired*-

Having primarily an economic motive at the outset, diplomatic

and political developments between Germany and the Western democracies prompted
the Reich to adopt an increasingly aggresive policy towards the Balkans.
By the very nature of its title , The N azi Penetration into Southeastern
Europe, 1933-41, this thesis evaluates Germany's change in policy, from economic
penetration to political strangulation.

The paper also supports the premise that the

political saturation and m ilitary occupation of the Balkans were consequences of a
successful German policy of economic exploitation.
m ilitary subjugation of these states existed.

No preconceived plan for

However, as Germany's difficulties

with the West increased, likewise did her ambitions concerning the Balkans.

From

1937 onward, the Reich began to realize the importance of the Southeast not only
in terms of economics but also in respect to its strategic value.
Also of major importance to the thesis is the weakness shown by France
and Great Britain in the face of N a zi aggression.

This paper emphasizes the con^

sequences of the West's hesitancy to halt the Nazis in their aggressive European
policy.

It facilitated the Reich's advancement into an isolated Southeastern

Europe.
• • •

in

The majority of the sources contributing to the research for this paper are
documentary.

The most valuable reference materials are the League of Nations’

annual financial publications, World Economic Survey,
and International Trade Statistics.

Review of World Trade,

Great Britain's Department of Overseas Trade

publications also contributed heavily to the research.

The most vital of the non

economic references are the United States Department of State's Documents on
German Foreign Policy, Series "C" and "D. "
O f the first-hand accounts, or memoirs, those of Ciano and Churchill are
the most frequently cited.

Others, such as Horthy, von Fapen, and Nicolson are

used primarily for background study.
Many secondary sources are utilized, but the most valuable for this paper
are Gerhard Schacher's Germany Pushes Southeast, Antonin Basch's The Danube
Basin and the German Economic Sphere and John Luckacs1, The Great Powers and
and Eastern. Europe.

Special recognition must be given to the invaluable aid pro

vided by the Royal Institute of International Affairs' Survey o f International Affairs,
1931-1941.

These volumes provide an excellent guide for both reference and

further bibliographical exploration.

CURRENCY EQUIVALENCIES AS OF
JANUARY 31, 1936*

2.5

REICHSMARK

(Germany)

49.

DINAR

(Yugoslavia)

127

LEU

(Rumania)

105

DRACHMA

(Greece)

74

LEVA

(Bulgaria)

3 .5

PENGO

(Hungary)

24

KORUNA

(Czechoslovakia)

5 .4

SCHILLING

(Austria)

16.0

FRANC

(France)

.22

POUND

(Great Britain)

*By no means are these figures stationary. Throughout the period
covered by this paper, the values of the various currencies (with exception of the
Reichsmark) fluctuated. The date, January 31, 1936, was chosen because it
represented the most approximate consistency of the proportionate values during
the era. Compiled from: : Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Reserve Bulletin, V o l. 22, February, 1936 (Washington: United States
Government Printing O ffice, 1936), pp. 3 -4 5.
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CHAPTER I
THE GERMAN A N D BALKAN SITUATION IN 1933

Between 1929 and 1933 the whole world was in an economic crisis.
effects were felt not only in financial circles but in all aspects of life .

Its

The over-

expansion of world production during the first World War and the ensuing decade
had not been satisfactorily curbed, causing an over-abundance in agrarian produce.
A sharp reduction in the demand for agricultural products resulted in a drastic price
decrease, leaving millions jobless, poverty-stricken and starving.
Worldwide industrial production experienced a similar decline during the
years of the depression,

In the years 1928-1932, total world production of manu-

factured goods decreased by 34 per cent.

2

One of the immediate effects of the economic debacle was
ing number of people left jobless.

It has been estimated that world unemployment

in 1929 amounted to 10 million persons.

Present

anoverwhelm

3

By 1932, however, discounting

^Eugene N..Anderson, Modern Europe in World Perspective, 1914 to the
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p . 332.
^ Ib id ., p. 329.
^ Ib id ., p. 332 .
1

2

part-time employed, the number approximated 40 m illion.

4

The average rate of

unemployment for the countries of Europe and North America reached nearly 25
per cent.'*
Throughout the world, each country tried to ward off the effects of the
depression.

Nations attempted to maintain an export surplus in order to keep as

many people employed as possible.

6

On the other hand, each country restricted

the quantity of its imports to a minimum of essentials.^

The entire system failed.

Declining prices made it necessary to sell more and more abroad,

Foreign sales

became more difficult as each nation strove to become as self sufficient as their
domestic resources would permit.
The Great Depression had many effects on the stability of the international
economy.

A world-wide tendency toward economic nationalism in the form of
g

tariffs was an early result.

The universal imposition of tariffs ruined free trade

throughout the world, as illustrated by the following table:

^ Ib id ., p. 332. It is virtually impossible to arrive at an exact figure.
The League of Nations publications set the figure at 25 m illion. See: League of
Nations, World Economic Survey, 1932/33 (Geneva: 1932), p. 109. Hereafter
cited as: League, W .E . 5 .
c
Anderson, p , 332.
^This procedure became known as the "export of depression."
^ An derson, p . 335,
® League, W .E .5 ., 1931/1932, p. 65.

3

Table 1
9

Total Value of World Trade — 1929-1932
(in millions)

First Quarters

Year

Imports

: Exports

Total

1929

35,606

33,035

68,641

15,292

1930

20,083

26,492

55,575

13,885

1931

20,847

18,922

39,769

9,685

1932

13,885

12,726

26,611

6,460
6,006

1933

An overall effect of the depression was a sixty-five per cent decline
in world trade from the first quarter of 1929 to the same quarter in 1933.

10

The

disruption of normal trade by the inauguration of restrictive tariffs had the overall
effect of a shrinkage of world markets.

Accordingly, trading countries, particu

larly debtor nations, experienced increasing difficulty in gaining credit.

This in

turn produced a highly tightened money situation, a decline in national income
and a rise in unemployment.

^ League, W .E .S . , 1932/33,

p. 2 ,

^ Ib id ., p. 3.
^ League,

W .E .S ., 1931/32,

p. 66.

4

The decision of Great Britain and the United States to abandon the gold
standard did not serve to lessen the problem of financial stability but in fact com
plicated i t .

By mid-1933, three main currency groups in the world had emerged.

These monetary factions were the gold bloc, the sterling bloc and the dollar
bloc.

12

France and Italy led the countries of the gold bloc, Great Britain and

the United States formed the nucleus of the sterling and dollar blocs, respectively.
By 1933, however, a fourth group composed entirely of debtor nations, with
Germany as the most prominent member, began to form.
foreign exchange

13

This was known as the

bloc, whose common goal was the maintenance of the in divi-

dual currencies of the various states.
of Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia

14

,

Besides Germany, the new bloc consisted

15

In January, 1933, Germany underwent the most abrupt upheaval since
the inception of the Weimar Republ ic.

Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist

12 League, W .E .5 ., 1932/33,

p. 227.

iq
°The term "foreign exchange" will be dealt with in detail later.
now, a simple definition of "goods for goods" will suffice.

For

14 One of the chief goals of the new N azi Regime in Germany was to
escape devaluation of the mark. The new government feared that devaluation
would be interpreted by the German people as a sign of another ineffective govern
ment. It must be remembered that at this early stage, the National Socialist Party
still faced stern competition at home.
1R
S.
Press, 1936), p. 202.

E. Harris,

Exchange Depreciation

(Cambridge; Harvard University

5

Party gained control of the country.

The nation's internal economic situation was

perhaps the ma|or factor contributing to the political unrest that existed within the
Reich.

Germany, which experienced the depression in a most acute way, was

particularly slow in showing signs of economic recovery.

O f the six largest indus-

trial nations in the world* Germany proved to be the only one not to show a slight
16
increase in 1932 over the previous year in the quantum of imports and exports.
Seeking relief from the economic chaos, a rapidly increasing portion of the popu
lation enthusiastically lent their support to Hitler's barrage of promises.
Fuehrer's program called for the complete reorganization of the Reich.
1933, the N azi leader launched an extensive public works program.

The
On May 1,

The immediate

aim was the reduction of the vast numbers of unemployed within the country.

17

The following day, May 2 , a ll labor and trade unions became nationalized, under
the control of the Party.

18

The following February, the Reich enacted a "Law to

Prepare the Organic Reconstruction of the German Economy," enabling the Nazis
to regulate all types and quantity of German industrial output.

16 League, W .E .S ., 1933/34,

19

in its efforts to

p. 227.

^7 At the time of Hitler's accession to power, there were from six to seven
million unemployed in Germany. See: Vaso Trivanovitch, Economic Development
of Germany under National Socialism (New York City: National Industrial Con
ference Board, In c ., 1937), p. 6 .

18

Trivanovitch, p. 9 .

Gustaf Stolper, The German Economy, 1870 to the Present
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, In c ., 1967), p . 139.

(New

6

stimulate the lowest agricultural index since 1913, the Reich at the same time

20
assumed complete control over that aspect of the economy,
The man chosen to guide the Reich in Hitler's program of "organic recovery"

21

was Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht,

Economic Affairs.

23

22

appointed as Minister of

(In the early thirties he already had shown the economic

feasibility of a totalitarian movement

24

by making the following remarks:)

. . . the secret of financing Germany's political and
economic tasks lies in a centralized and rigid concentration
of the whole public and private activities of the German Reich,
that is, public finance as well as private economy. This
concentration is on Impossible within a state based on
authoritarian rules.

20

Robert A . Brady, The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism
York: The Viking Press, 1937), p. 225.

(New

9i

The term "organic recovery" refers to recovery of every aspect of
Germany's economic situation.
r\ry

A former president of the Reich shank, Schacht had resigned in 1931
over a dispute concerning payment of the Young Plan installments. Hitler reap
pointed him to the post in 1933. In 1934 he was also given the portfolio of
Minister of Economics. A t no time was Schacht a member of the Nazi Party. He
was acquitted at the Nuremberg Trials.
^ T h e actual head of the Reich's economic recovery program was Herman
Gb'ring, and consequently Schacht's position was actually subordinate. Schacht's
refusal to join the N azi Party probably explained the titular head of the recovery
program being given to Goring.
OA

Schacht's sympathy towards a totalitarian government does not neces
sarily refer to the Nazi Party. Viewing the situation from strictly an economic
viewpoint, a totalitarian government, to him, was the most feasible.
9c
3 Amos E. Simpson, Hjalmar Schacht in Perspective
and C o ., Printers, 1969), p. 82.

(Paris: Mouton

7

After 1933, Dr*. Schacht's control -over business activity became absolute.
When he assumed his duties, the Reich's debt, not including direct foreign invest
ments within Germany, foreign owned bonds, or foreign owned private real estate,
was over RM. 4 .9 billion.

26

O f this RM. 2 .2 billion were short-term debts that

had matured one month prior to Schacht's appointment.

27

An enormous task faced H itler, Schacht qnd other members of the govern
ment in their efforts to rehabilitate the German economy.

A high rate of unem

ployment, a faltering production output, an unstable currency, the tight money
and scarce markets due to tariffs were problems that seemed insurmountable.

To be sure, the Reich was not alone in its economic difficulties.

The

world-wide depression and its immediate effects were equally as dire in the coun
tries of Southeastern Europe.

Several factors explained the depressed status

and the slow recovery of the Balkan States.

One of the area's chief problems

was rural overpopulation and the low production ability of the farmer.

2^ Brady,

28

In

p. 242.

27

National Industrial Conference Board, The Situation in Germany at
the Beginning of 1933
(New Y o rk :; National Industrial Conference Board, Inc.,
1933), p. 9 .
Hereafter cited as N .I. C .B ., Situation in Germany.
28 In 1930, 61 .5 per cent of the rural population in Yugoslavia was regarded
as "surplus," 53 per cent in Bulgaria, 51 .4 per cent in Rumania, and 5 0 .3 per cent
in Greece. For a detailed graph of the chronic situation, see: L. S , Stavrianos,
The Bajkans Since 1453 (New York: Rinehart and C o ., Inc., 1958), p. 596.

8

general, one Balkan farmer grew enough for 1.5 persons while in countries of
r
29
western; Europe, the ratio was one to four.
The problem was compounded by the adoption of protective measures by
other European countries to protect their own agricultural production.

30

Due to

the more highly mechanized farming methods of overseas producers, Balkan farmers
found themselves undersold on the world market.

Consequently, the agrarian sec

tor of Southeastern Europe found itself unable to compete with western European
cereal producers at world market price levels,
Even before Hitler's advent, the countries ofSoutheastern Europe
found themselves on a veritable treadmill.
tion in relation to their productivity.

32

31

had

The primary problem was overpopula-

This resulted in low agricultural incomes.

29

Ib id ., p. 5 9 . "population pressure" (the number of people dependent
upon one acre of land) is not incompatible with agricultural prosperity. As a case,
one can look at the Netherlands, where 81.7 population pressure exceed Rumania
(7 9 .7 , the highest in the Balkans). Yet the Netherland's income and standard of
living far exceeded the Balkans. The key to the problem is productivity,
30

N . I . C . B . , , Situation in Germany, p. 18

31

For purposes of space, this paper deals primarily with Rumania,
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and-Greece . Albania, largely accepted as a sphere of
Italy, is dealt with peripherally. Turkey is ignored altogether.
2 2 Royal Institute of International Affairs Southeastern Europe: A
Political and Economic Survey, (London; Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 184,
Hereafter cited as: S <ET "The population of Southeastern Europe had risen
from 46 million in 1920 to 54 million in 1933.

9

A drastic r-eduction in the national income curtailed economic development in
other areas.

Protective Import and immigration quotas by foreign countries,

when added to all of the above, clearly left the Balkan States in a quandary.

33

The greatest problem of the Balkans, however, was the inability of the respective
governments to relieve the people of their plight,

34

Political instability made attempts to alleviate the economic situation
very difficult.

The Draconian peace settlements at the end of World War I also

seriously affected the political rapport among the Balkan States,
particularly embittered.

Bulgaria was

The Treaty of N euilly (November 27, 1919) had given

Southern Dobrudja to Rumania and Western Thrace to G reece.

35

The Bulgars

also had lost 975 square miles of their most strategic areas to Yugoslavia, which
qz
included access to the vital Belgrade-Saloniki Railway network,
the treaty was to alienate Bulgaria from the other Balkan States.

The result of
37

The harsh

impositions on Bulgaria by the victorious nations would one day return to haunt
the other Balkan States.

The N euilly Treaty was to be the main factor

^ L, -k. Stavrianos, p , 597,
34 Ib id., p. 598.
35 Ibid,
36

Greece did offer; Bulgaria a trade Outlet to the Aegean Sea but Bulgaria
refused, preferring to nurse a grievance rather than accept a settlement and injure
their resettlement claims. See: Stavrianos, p, 579,
07

°

settlement.

In addition, Bulgaria was saddled with a 450 million dollar reparation
She was also forced to limit the size of her arrriy to 53,000 men.

in the failure of the inter-Balkan conferences during the thirties.

38

Bulgaria's

dominqnt policy concerning her relationship with other Balkan countries was
directed towards territorial revision.

In short, Bulgaria's revisionist aims

divided the southeastern European states at precisely the moment when unity was
needed the most.
The Balkan States failed to draw together and barter as a single unit,
Instead, each country dealt with foreign competition individually, often working
openly against one another,

Throughout; the period, however, there were several

attempts at Balkan unit.
A series of conferences began in 1930,
October.

The first convened in Athens in

Little was accomplished because arguments concerning minority prob

lems and revisionist disputes overshadowed economic discussions.

A week prior

to the opening of the talks,Bulgaria decided not to participate at all because the
39

minorities question was not on the agenda.

But Alexander Papanastassiou

persuaded the Bulgarian delegation to attend by promising that the minorities
situation would be discussed "in principle."

40

But the assembly decided,

The loss of land was not the only difficulty established at N eu illy ,
Vast population changes caused problems not only for Bulgaria, but for countries
receiving the land.
Former Premier of Greece, head of the First and Third Balkan
Conferences.
^ R, J . Kerner a nd H , N . Ho ward, The Balkan Conferences and the
Balkan Entente, 1930-1935
(Berkeley: University of'California Press, 1936),
p. 30. "

against 'Bulgaria's wishes, to place the minorities question on the agenda for a
second conference .

Although all controversial issues were thereby carefully

avoided, the talks failed to achieve any progress contributing to economic cooperation among the Balkan States,

41

disputes on the minorities question.

These shortcomings were primarily due to the
In fact, the most significant accomplishment

of the conclave was agreement concerning the agenda of a second conference,^
The second Balkan conference met in Istanbul in January, 1931.
. 43
Bulgaria's animosity toward Yugoslavia
again contributed to the failure of this
meeting.

44

In his speech to the representatives during the early discussions,

Mohammed Konitza, head of the Albanian delegation stated?
When one wishes to build a house, one does not begin with
the doors and windows, but with the foundation, and the foun
dation of the common house we wish to bui|d is the equitable
settlement of the rights of minorities,4^
One of the few times that the minorities and revisionist questions were
mentioned on the floor of the conference discussions was in Konitza's speech.

4 ^ Ib id ,, p . 47.
42 Ibid.
4 ^ Yugoslavia was against the formation of a tariff union among the
Balkan States, about the only thing on the agenda that Bulgaria did approve o f.
The two nations were also at odds over joint border claipis,
44

Norman J , Pa del ford,
University Press, 1 9 3 5 ) > p ,l l.

Peace in the Balkans

45

Kerner and Howard, p. 51.

(New York; Oxford

12

During this congress, attention was cpven to the possibility of the formation of a
Balkan union.

A controversy over the value of such a confederation developed

between Yugoslavia and Greece.

Professor Th. Georgevich, ^

prominent

member of the Yugoslav delegation, believed the idea of a political union to be
premature.

47

Papanastassiou, while dis disclaiming the need for economic rap

prochement, vigorously supported the proposals for multilateral political discussions among the Balkan States.

48

The fate of the conference was sealed on the

second day of the sessions when M r. Papanastassiou rejected any proposals for
treaty revision for the remainder of the talks.

49

Issues were already occurring at the meetings.
treatment towards the minority groups.

Heated debates over minority
Albania accused Yugoslavia of i l (

The Bulgarian delegation again unleashed

its hostile disposition on Yugoslavia over territorial disputes.

46

50

Dr. Georgevich, Yugoslavia’s foremost economic expert, believed
economics to be the root of almost every Balkan problem. He postulated that a
Balkan bank would not only lead to an inter-Balkan customs association but stimu
late a general southeastern European agricultural recovery.
In this way, he
reasoned, harmony among the states would branch out into all aspects of political
and commercial intercourse. Sees Kerner and Howard, The Balkan Conferences,
p. 49.
47

Kerner and Howard, p. 49.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.
5 0 Ib id ., p . . 52.

13

For a second time, the post-war settlements thwarted an attempt at
Balkan unity.

The achievements of the Second Balkan Conference were negligible,

-The meager accompl ishments o f the conclave were limited aehievements related
to inter-Baikan railway and telephone communications, postal cooperation and
mutual protection and guarantee of agricultural products.

51

The delegations

also approved a proposal calling for diplimatic discussions at regular intervals,
Economically, the conference achieved nothing of importance.

52

53

The Third Balkan Conference, held in Bucharest in October, 1932
proved even less successful than the two previous meetings.

Boundary claims

and minority disputes erupted before the opening ceremonies were completed.

On

54
October 21, the Bulgarian delegation presented M . Ciceo Pop
with a letter
announcing its withdrawal from the talks.

55

The Albanian representatives

51

It must be mentioned here that in conjunction with the main conference
at Istanbul, an agricultural conference of the same nations was held in Sophia,
Bulgaria. -The conference dealt primarily with agricultural research collaboration
and studied the possibilities of alleviating barriers to an inter-Baikan Customs
Union, The refusal of Yugoslavia to participate in the discussions lessened the
conference's effectiveness and ultimately caused its failure. Sees Kerner and
Howard, The Balkan Conferences, p. 48. See alsos Arnold J, Toynbee, Survey
of International Affairs, 1931. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1932), pp. 3 2 4 -3 2 9 ,J
^ Kerner and Howard, p . 65.
^^The major economic achievement was the founding of a Balkan Tobacco
O ffice to coordinate and adapt tobacco production to the needs of the world
market.
~*v\Ciceo Pop, President of the Rumanian Chamber of Deputies, head of
the Rumanian delegation, was chosen as President of the Third Balkan Conference.
Stanley Evans, A Short History of Bulgaria
Wishart, L td ., 1960), p. 171.

(London: Lawrence and

14

threqtned a similarboycott if discussion*)! theminoritiesquestion was not placed
on the agenda.

56

The delegates , without Bulgaria's participation, approved the

formulation of a Balkan pact

that would take into consideration problems of

minority groups and revisionist claims.

This was the most significant accomplish

ment of the third conference.
In November, 1933,
fourth congress.

58

57

Balkan representatives met in Salonika for a

It accomplished little more than the three previous ones.

The

most important accomplishment of the meeting was an agreement by the delegates
to meet again and to formulate a Balkan pact.
-The underlying factor in the failure of the four congresses was Bulgaria's
refusal to accept the N euilly Treaty as fin a l.

The Bulgars vehemently opposed

any proposal that called for recognition of the status quo.

59

56

The Albanian delegation did withdraw temporarily but, unlike
Bulgaria, left observers. Within four days, Albania returned to the Congress.
See: Kerner and Howard, The Balkan Conferences, p. 75.
57

The conference was originally scheduled for September, but trouble
between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria over boundary disputes postponed the opening for
two months. See; Kerner and Howard, The Balkan Conferences, p, 95.
58

Private bilateral discussions between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were
held in conjunction with the regular conferences. This was the only wgy in which
the Bulgars could be induced to send a delegation to Salonika. See: Kerner and
Howard, The Balkan Conferences, p. 96,
'^Stavrianos,

p .738.

15

In February, 1934, a final attempt at southeastern European unity occurred
with the signing of the Balkan Pact by representatives of Greece, Yugoslavia,
Turkey and-Rumania .

60

The pact was later transformed into the Balkan Entent.

It provided the participating governments with some measure of unity but Bulgaria's
refusal to participate weakened the pact.

The Balkan Entente achieved precisely

the opposite results that the four conferences had intended.

The congresses' ini-’

tiaI objective was inter-Balkan unify, achieved by lessening Bulgaria's problems.
However, in failing to reach a detente concerning revisionist claims and minority
disputes, the conclaves met with little success.

The Entente, an offshoot of the

conferences, had , as its basic premise, maintenance of the post-war status quo.

61

As any idea of the sort was unacceptable to the Bulgars, the signing of the Balkan
Pact left Southeastern Europe-divided more than ever.

Bulgaria was isolated from

the rest of the Balkans.

Instead of forminga homogenous unit to fight the encroachment of foreign
nations, the Balkan countries chose to operate as single units.

Inter-Balkan dis

putes, primarily caused by the bitter disputes between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia
about the boundary settlements made at the end of World War I, pitted the coun
tries against one another.

The four Balkan Conferences had achieved nothing.

The offshoot of the conferences, the Balkan Pact, was ineffective.

^ Ib id ., p. 738.

In fact, the
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Pact did more harm than good.

It split Southeastern Europe into two camps.

By

the end of 1933, the Balkan States, as far as unity was concerned, were in a worse
position than they had been when the conferences began.
The German Reich was also in a condition of economic instability in 1933.
The world was gradually emerging from the years of the depression, but Germany,
saddled by war reparations and outstanding debts during the period, was slower to
emerge from the depths of the economic recession of 1929-1931 .
The formation of international currency blocs further isolated both
Germany and Southeastern Europe from the world market.

It was this impediment

that would soon awaken both areas to the advantages of economic cooperation.

CHAPTER II
REORIENTATION OF THE REICH'S COMMERCIAL POLICY

The deterioration of German diplomatic ties with the West was to be
a determining factor in the shift in emphasis to Southeastern Europe.

The political

differences between Germany and the western democracies brought about a com
plete reorganization of N azi: Germany's commercial policy.
As early as A pril, 1933, public opinion in the United States and
Great Britain showpd a great deal of misgivings concerning the N azi Regime.
The Reich's treatment of Jews produced a wave of indignation in both countries.
The feeling was also expressed at the diplomatic level, as on April 12, 1933, the
German Ambassador to Great Britain, Leopold von Hoesch, warned the Reich
Foreign Ministry that: " . . .

in recent weeks Germany has lost an extraordinary
1

amount of ground in England."
Simon,

2

Hoesch talked with Great Britain's Sir John

who told him:
. . . it was an undeniable fact that Germany has lost
a great deal of sympathy in England during the past few
weeks, and precisely with the very persons who had
formerly been staunch advocates of Germany. The British
government regretted this exceedingly, since it disrupted
its policy.^

United States Department of State, Documents on German Foreign
Policy, 1918-1945
(Washington; Government Printing O ffice, 1953), Series
"C", V o l. I. , p. 282. Hereafter cited as: D. G e r. F .P ,
2

British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

3 P . G er. F .P ., Ser. "C ", V o l. I , , p . 282.
17

18

Resentment in the United States towards Germany's anti-Semitic poi i —
cies closely paralleled that in Great Britain.

A remark made by Secretary of

State Stimson in March, 1933, revealed the concern of the United States Govern
ment with Germany's anti-semitic policies:

"While this government is disinclined

to lend credence to the reports (of Jewish persecution), it is causing widespread
distress among a large section of the American people."

4

The feelings of hostility aroused over the treatment of the Jews affected
the success of discussions concerning other matters.

In August, 1933, von Ho esc h

described the danger of the strained commercial relations between Great Britain and
Germany in his report to the German Foreign Ministry.

This report also discussed

the Anglo-German relationship as being:
. . . worse in financial circles, where apart from every
thing else, an unfavorable effect is caused . . . by danger of
the loss of financial transactions with Germany and . . . by
(the) anxiety concerning a further deterioration in the business
situation through threatening political complications.^
The greatest rift between Germany and the West was one which had
both political and economic consequences.

It occurred in June, 1933, when the

Reich cabinet approved a law calling for a complete Transfer M o r a t o r i u m I n

United States Department of State,-Foreign Relations of the United
States (Washington: : Government Printing Office', 1933), V o l. I I . , p. 320.
Hereafter cited a s :: F .R. of U .S .
5 D .G e r. F .P ,, Ser. "C ", V o |. 11. , p . 753.

^ Ibido> Ser, "C ", Voi . 1 , , p. 343.
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sessense,

Act provided for an indefrnite postponement of payments on the

■: Dawes and Young loans.

7

8
Sir Eric Phipps described Schacht's defense of the

Moratorium in a speech to the Diplomatic Corps as "very badly received by the
non-German section of the audience

9

That same month, Scherpenberg

was sternly rebuffed in his attempt

to follow Schacht's plan to establish clearing agreements concerning trade regula11

tions with Great Britain,

Von Hoesch wrote the Reich Foreign Office in

Berlin that:
(The British Government) drew attention to the great
irritation caused in Britain by Germany’s announcement
that she was postponing her transfers in respect to the
Reich government's loan, bonds of which were held (in
Britain) among all sections of the population as investment
securities. ^

^The interest on the Dawes loan due to Great Britain at the time of
the Moratorium was- RM. 845 m illion, plus a redemption service of RM 3 .2 million,
See: : D. G e r. F .P ., Ser. "G" , V o l S e r . "C ", Vol . I I I , p . 91.
g
British Ambassador to Germany, August, 1933 - A p ril, 1937.
9

Great Britain, Documents on British Foreign Pol icy, 1 9 1 9 - 1939
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery O ffice, 1957), Second Series, V o l. V I .,
p. 774.
^ Schacht's son-in-law, and Secretary of the Legation at the German
Embassy in London.
11

0fS ta te , P ..G e r. F .P . , Ser. "C ", V o l. Ill, p. 21.

^ Ibid., p .,5 1 .

The British Government immediately retaliated by drastically curtailing German
imports.
A c t."

The tariff was called, "The Debts Clearing Office Import Restrictions

13

In October, 1933 another problem arose which produced not only dip
lomatic and military complications but formed the basis for a major economic
division between Germany and the West.

Diplomats and economists from France,

Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States, deadlocked at the Geneva
Disarmament Conference since early January, heard Hitler's special envoy
announce: mWe shall have to leave both the Disarmament Conference and the
League of Nations, since the condition that we be recognized as a nation with
equality of rights is not fu lfilled . "

14

A t the end of 1933, Germany's relations with the western decocracies
was comparable to the immediate post-war era.

It is possible that the Moratorium

was the primary factor responsible for the strained economic relationship between
the Reich and the West, although its withdrawal from the League certainly

1 *3

°The Reich further retaliated with a "Law an the Application of
Measures for Reprisals Against Foreign Countries." The statute gave the govern
ment the power to regulate business with any country that, in the N azi view,
appeared to be discriminatory towards Germany. See: Department of State,
D . G e r. F .P ., Ser. "C", V o l. I l l ., p . 86.
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accelerated the diplomatic schism.

Since it anticipated continued problems with

the West, not only politically but economically, the Reich realized the necessity
of reorientating its commercial policy.

In both theory and practice, German economic recovery paralleled
industrial output, with armament production the ultimate go al.

Dr. Schacht
15

believed that the manufacture of weapons was the most useful expenditure.
The industrialization program in the early years of 1933 and 1934
achieved Schacht's immediate aim.

During this period, unemployment fell

sharply while the national income greatly increased.

The total net income went

from RM. 4 5 .2 billion in 1932, reached RM. 4 6 .6 billion in 1933 and then
soared to RM, 5 2 .7 billion in 1 9 3 4 ,^

The armament expenditure wasRM.
17

1.6 billion at the end of 1933 and rose to RM. 9 .8 billion by the end of 1935.
Dr. Schacht felt that a vast rearmament program would provide the
quickest solution to Germany's unemployment problem.

The relevance of rearma

ment to the German economy was summarized by his statement to the London press
corps in early 1935: "A country which was not arrried could not defend itself and

^Simpson, p . 90.
16
Office of the United States Chief of Council for Prosecution of
Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, V o l. V I .
(Washington:
Government Printing O ffice, 1946), p . 139. Hereafter cited as: N .C .A .
17

Kenyon Poole, German Financial Policies, 1932-39
Harvard University Press, 1939), p. 94,

(Cambridge:

22
18

consequently, it would have no voice in the concert of Nations."
Dr. Schacht's "New Plan" for German foreign policy had two main
objectives; 1) to import nothing that could not be paid for from the proceeds of
exports, and 2) to regulate German imports to the basic national needs.
Schacht's plan included four methods of operation.
"Clearing Agreement" with a foreign country.

19

The first provided for a

Using this device, the Reich

cou|d predetermine the amount of trade with a country before transacting any com
mercial agreement.

The two countries would agree to sell identical amounts of

goods, and in this way both participants could avoid a surplus which would result
, • •
20
in a deficiency of accounts.
The second method was known as the "Barter System."

When this

device was used, Germany and another country would exchange a certain product
of one type for a specified amount of another.
received compensation from clearing houses.

21

Importers and exporters then
When the third device, "Import

18

International M ilitary Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals
Nuremberg, N o v. 14, 1945 - October 1, 1946, Vol . X II, (Germany, Nuremberg,
1949), p. 476. Hereafter cited as: I.M .T .
19

Simpson, p. 93.

This, of course, changed when the Reich began

stockpiling.
20
21

Poole, p. 143.

See following footnote.

Ibid. The producers and eventual exporters were paid for their goods
by their own governments. Consequently, only goods and no money crossed the
border. This was an integral part of Schacht's plan. Any surplus of goods going
into the Balkans merely increased the amount of the Reich's credit in that country.
In this way, the Reich often violated its agreement in exchanging production
amounts equal in value.

23

Licensing" was employed, only goods vital to German production and livelihood
entered the Reich.

22

The fourth and final modus operandi was known as the

"Export Subsidy Turnover Assessment Law."

This guise further regulated the flow

of trade and also provided a tax schedule for certain imports.

To obtain needed

vital materials, German exporters drastically cut their prices below both the
foreign market prices and their own production costs.

After the exporters obtained

the needed materials, they received a rebate from the equalization fund created by
forced contributions from the entire industry under the terms of the Export Subsidy
Turnover Assessment.

23

Schacht's economic policy also resorted to the utilization of "Blocked
Marks. 11

Foreigners who owned funds within Germany were forbidden to transfer

them outside the Reich,

Entrapped within Germany, the notes on the funds pro

vided a quick profit for German investors. ^

Schacht's position enabled him to

raise the rate of discount (sometimes as high as fifty per cent) and resell the notes
to German speculators.

25

Thus, foreign creditors lost while German specu lators

22

By this device, a list of items drawn up compelled each importer to
check with his local clearing house for its approval before bringing items into the
country. See; Poole, German Financial Policies, p. 144.
23

. i
Ibid.

24
Vaso Trivanovitch, Economic Development of Germany under
National Socialism (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, Inc,
1937), p. 105.
2 5 I.M .T .,

V o l. X X X V I, p, 516.

24

profited.

The government, in turn, placed a tax on the profits realized by the

discounts.
- D r. Schacht tightened his grip on German foreign trade even further
when he introduced the "Aski-M ark."

26

With these an exporter who sold goods

to Germany was paid in a special issue of marks that could be used only as payment for other German products.

27

The value of the Aski-Marks varied from

country to country and were non-negotiable outside the nation in which they
first were issued.

28

The advantages of these marks were twofold:

1) Reich

manufacturers had complete control over the prices of their products in a foreign
country.

German marketers could undersell, depending on the competition, or

raise the prices at w ill, as the marks were good only for German products; 2)
the German exporters could force the value of the "Aski-Marks" down by res
tricting the type of products or by manipulating the prices of goods within a coun
try.

The profit was realized when the "Aski-Marks" began to reappear within

Germany at a mark-up in value.

29

Under Schacht's plan, Germany abandoned the entire system of multi
lateral trade.

There were three reasons for this: 1) Germany had no desire to

26

Blocked Marks differed from Ask‘~Marks in that Blocked Marks were
restricted entirely to internal Germany, while Aski-Marks (essentially the same
thing) were used in foreign countries.
^Trivan o vitch , p. 166.
2 8 c.
Q,
Simpson, p. 97.

29 ibid.

25

expand trade with countries whose economic structure resembled her own; 2) the
Reich wished to develop a sound economic relationship with countries that com
plemented her own, and 3) German trade relations with western Europe and the
United States showed a continual decline.

30

Prior to Schacht's involvement,

Germany's total trade with the United States alone dropped from $254 million in
1929 to $176 million in 1930.

31

reached the $200 million le v e l.

By the end of 1933, the amount had not yet

32

There were numerous reasons for the Reich's economic interest in the
Balkans.

Most important was Germany's trouble with the West.

The foreign

trade policy of Great Britain and the United States made it necessary for the Reich
to seek commerce with nations who were willing to sell their products without
payment in the normal foreign exchange bills.

The Balkans' inability to compete

with western Europe on the world market made them much more accessible to Ger
man trade overtures.
The Reich's trade with countries who had formerly provided her with
her main sources of raw materials showed a steady decline.

33

The following table

3 0 Basch, p. 171,
31

United States Tariff Commission, Compilation of Data on United
States Trade with Germany (Washington: Government Printing O ffice, 1939),
page V . Hereafter cited as U .S .T ,C .
32lb id ., p. V II.

3 3

Basch, p . 46.

26

illustrates the continued decrease of her overseas supplies.

Table 2 34
Decrease in the Riech's Overseas Suppl ies 0934-36)
RM.

(i n m il { io n s )

% O f Total Imports

1934

1935

1936

1934

1935

1936

United States

373

241

232

8 ,4

5 r8

$ .5

British Dominions

264

121

127

5 .9

2 ,4

3 ,0

Netherlands & France

132

120

113

3 .0

2 ,9

2 .7

Argentina

152

143

119

3 .4

3 ,4

2 .8

T o t a ls

921

625

591

20.7

15.0

14.0

Year
Im p o rts fro m :

The year 1935 showed an increase in the Reich's economic ambitions
in Southeastern Europe.

In that year, German imports increased from 248 to 319

million or by 29% and exports to the Balkans rose from 171 to 252 million marks,
a respectable 40% increase.

35

During the same period, imports from Germany's

heretofore largest suppliers of raw materials, mainly the United: States, Canada

34 Ib id ., p. 40.
35
1934-1938),

League of Nations, Review of World Trade, 1933-1937
1935, p. 38.
^
"

(Genova:

27

and Great Britain, declined from RM.

576.6

to RM. 292.5 million, nearly a 50%

j
36
decrease.

Southeastern Europe represented an ideal and logical choice for
German economic exploitation.

The Balkan area fit perfectly into the N azi plan

lor economic penetration since Germany, even during the depression years, had
been the chief supplier of goods for these countries.

37

These factors helped the

Reich to gain unlimited credit in the area .
A look at the production possibilities of the Balkan States prompted
the N azi Government to make a great effort to exploit the potential of those
38
countries .

Schacht himself directed a trade offensive into the Balkans.

understood the necessity of gaining economic control of the Balkan States,

He
A

study of the resource possibilities of the area showed that complete domination of
the countries would result in an end to the Reich's foodstuff shortage-

Statistics

revealed that control of Southeastern Europe's grain and cereal production would
overcome Germany's annual deficit of 41 million metric quintals.

39

Similar

36 Ibid.
37 Gerhard Schacher,
Blackett, 1937), p. 147.

Germany Pushes Southeast;

(London: Hurst and

38

Hjalmar H . G . Schacht, Confessions of the "O ld Wizard,"
(Boston: Houghton M ifflin Company, 1956), p. 303. Schacht's personal joprney
to the Balkan capitals will be discussed in Chapter III.
39

A quintal is approximately the equivalent of a hundredweight,

28

studies also revealed that Balkan natural resources could greatly alleviate the
Reich's need for raw materials (particularly oil from Rumania),

The deficit, in

fact, would change to a surplus, as the yearly average from southeast Europe's
production (not including that retained for domestic consumption) was approximately 46 million metric quintals.

40

By mid-1935, Germany's timber requirements reached about 4 4 .5
million metric quintals per annum,

The combined annual Balkan timber produc

tion approximated 38 million metric quintals.

Southeastern Europe also possessed

the capability of ameliorating the Reich's annual thirteen million metric quintals
41
bauxite requirement.

(Yugoslavia alone exported eight million m ,g. annually).

In addition to this, Yugoslavia and Rumania could fulfill Germany's need for 2.75
million tons of copper ore per year.

42

Germany was the largest importer of hides in Europe.

The Reich pur-

chased nearly 110,000 metric tons yearly, mostly from South America,

43

The

Balkan production, led by G reece, produced approximately 85,000 metric tons
per annum.

44

Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions
in Germany to March, 1936
(London: His Majesty's Stationery O ffice, 1936),
p . 175. Hereafter clted as: Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade,
41 Ib id ,, p. 151
4^ The Economist, N o v. 5 , 1938, p. 266,
43

Cleona Lewis, N azi Europe and World Trade
Brookings Institution, 1941, p, 18.

(Washington: The

44 Ib id., p. 266* The German need for leather was acute.
shortage existed in the manufacture of shoes, upholstering, etc.

A

29

- For Germany, the search for oil resources received top priority as
early as mid-1935.

This was because of Germany's rearmament program and her

increase in the production of industrial machinery.

By the end of 1936, the

Reich had imported over 3 .7 million metric tons of crude and refined o i l.

45

Germany's oil requirement ranged from 30 to 40 million m .q . per year but
•
Rumania had only supplied at most,
of a report issued by Dr . Funk,

47

10 million m .q . annually.

46

•
On the basis

Director of the State Institute of Geology,

Germany was willing to invest and assist in sinking additional wells in Rumania .

48

Basing his information on conducted tests, D r. Funk estimated that Rumanian oil
49
deposits could range from between 105 to 110 million tons of o il.

Foreign

interest in Rumanian oil fields, particularly on the part of Great Britain and
France, prompted the Reich's plan for speedy exploitation of Rumania's oil
50
trade.

45 Ib id ., p . 98
^ Gfeat Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, p . 179.
47

Dr. Walter Funk replaced Hjalmar Schacht as Minister of Economics
in November, 1937 when the latter fell out of favor with Hitler
48 ,
The Economist, N o v. 5, 1938, p. 266.
49

S .E .E ., p, 196. The publishers quote these figures using other
sources, but go into somewhat of a disagreement with them, saying that Funk's
figures are too high.
50 Ib id., pp. 129-135.

30

An extensive program of trade withSoutheastem Europe also promised
relief to Germany's cotton and wool deficiencies.
a remarkable shift.

Trade in these products showed

When the New Plan was first initiated, three-quarters of

Germany's imported cotton came from the United States.

By the beginning of

1936, however, the figure was less than one-quarter and was still declining.

51

Germany began her plan of economic penetration in southeastern
5
Europe by taking advantage of the Balkan's surplus of raw materials and foodstuffs.
The first goal of the Reich was to obtain more credit with the Balkan countries.
Germany initiated its plan by offering the Balkan producers prices five to ten per
cent above the current world market prices.

53

- Finding difficulty in securing

markets and unable to compete with the lower price indexes offered by western
Europe and the United States, the countries of southeastern Europe had no choice
but to accept the prices offered by the Reich .

The high prices paid for Balkan

goods greatly enhanced the image of Germany in the eyes of the peasants of the
countries.

Germany's popularity with the agrarian class in the Balkans made it

very difficult for the governments of southeastern Europe to decrease trade with
Germany.

If trade was discouraged, the Balkan governments feared strong

5 1 Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, p. 159.
5 2 Basch, p. 174.
5 3 S .E .E ., p. 196.

31

opposition at home.

54

This factor did a great deal to make the Reich successful.

Germany continued to tighten her grip on the Balkan countries.

The

second phase of Schacht's plan was to dictate the amount, quality, and terms of
trade within the Balkan area.

In March of 1935, the Reich began tp increase its

absorption of Balkan products, having already gained access to any amount of credit
it desired in the area.
The effect of these plans resulted in an enlargement of the Reich's debt
to the Balkan countries.

By March of 1935, the German indebtedness to southeas

tern Europe had reached a total of RM. 567 million, an increase of RM, 127 m illion from the same date in 1934.

56

The German policy of purchasing goods from

the Balkan area at higher prices greatly influenced the shift in Balkan economic
p i icy.

As creditor nations, they sought as quick a return on their loans as possible.

Acceptance of German products represented the mpst immediate tangible method.
Decreasing their importation from western Europe and the United States, the Balkans
increased their purchases from the Reich.

57

The following table illustrates the tre

mendous upswing in commercial activity between Germany and Southeastern
Europe.

54

Schacher, p. 150

55 i w d .

^^Basch, p. 175,
57
Ib id ., p, 174.

32
58

Table

3

Trade Statistics Between Germany and the Balkans
1933 - 1936

imports (from S .E. Europe)

In RM. (mi|l ions)

1934
34

Exports to (S.E. Europe)

1935
41

1936
58

1933
18

1934
19

1935
40

1936
48

Bulgaria

1933
31

Greece

53

55

59

68

19

29

49

63

Rumania

46

59

80

92

46

51

64

104

Yugoslavia

33

36

61

75

34

31

37

77

The percentage of Germany's total imports from Southeastern Europe rose
from six per cent in 1933 to 12 per cent in 1936 while exports to the Balkans rose
.5 9
from 3 .9 per cent to 9 .5 per cent in the same period.

By 1936, Germany

accounted for approximately 50 per cent of the entire world trade of Southeastern
Europe
Germany's economic policy towards Southeastern Europe took a sudden
change in the latter part of 1935.

Because of her indebtedness to the Balkan coun

tries, the Reich was able to dictate trade policy between Germany and the Balkan
countries.

If Germany paid five to 10 per cent above world prices for Balkan pro

ducts, it in turn marked up her own prices for exports destined to the Balkans by

^S ch ach er, p, 154
59 Ibid,
60 Ibid.

33

20 to 30 per cent above world market p ric e s .^
choice but to accept.
German debts.

62

The smaller countries had no

This was the only way in which they could lessen frozen

The only thing that the southeastern countries could do was to pay

the inflated prices to Germany in the hopes that they would be able to alleviate as
much of the German debt as possible.^

Germany began to import more foodstuffs

from the Balkan countries than it actually needed in order to increase Balkan depen
dency on itself.

The Reich also wished to stockpile for the future.

The Reich then began to regulate the type of commodities that it
exported to the Balkans.
Europe,

Germany broadened her export policy towards Southeastern

-Besides flooding the Balkan market with manufactured goods,

to export outdated machinery to the Balkans.
rid herself of obsolete machinery,

65

64

it began

In this way, Germany was able to

and increase Balkan dependency at the same

6 1 S ,E .E ., p. 196.
■ In 1935 several of the Balkan States attempted to break away from
this but failed, largely due to the League sanction against Italy, depriving them
(especially Yugoslavia) of a large portion of their trade. See; Basch, The Danube
Basin, pp.1 7 9 -1 8 0 .
6 3 S .E .E ., p. 196.
^ T h e Balkan region had been, since 1930, a "dumping ground" for
German exporters. The shipping of obsolete machinery to these countries came
only after the Balkan markets were flooded with articles such as Leica cameras,
mouth organs, aspirin, false teeth, cosmetics, toiletries, and certain medicines.
This account, however, is questioned by the writers of S .E . E p . 196.
^ A favorite trick of the Germans was offering the machinery at very
reduced prices, but skyrocketing the price for spare parts once the machine broke
down.

34

tim e.

66

'With the machinery, the Reich assumed that the Balkan region would be

able to improve its economic development,

Thus,Southeastern Europe would be in

a better position to aid Germany in fulfilling its need for raw materials for arma
ment production.
The export of machinery was only-one method which the Germans used
to coerce the Balkan countries into supplying the materials needed in the Reich
economy.

Germany also influenced a change in the type of crops produced in
67

southeastern Europe to those that would best supplement the Reich's deficiencies.
A German industrial firm, I . G . Farben, In c ., received land grands in Rumania
and Bulgaria,

These land grants totaled nearly 100,000 hectares.

was used exclusively for soya bean production and experiments-.

69

68

The land

At the time,

Germany provided the lone market for the Balkan soya bean industry.

The loss of

a market for the soya crop affected the Rumanian and Bulgarian economy.
Germany extended her exploitation ofSoutheastern Europe.

It gave

the Balkan countries no other recourse but to trade with the Reich at whatever
price she dictated.

In this way, Germany could resell her Balkan imports to other

^ B asch, p. 179.

^

Schacher,

p. 193.

^ O n e hectare =;

2 .47 acres.

^ S o y a beans were highly valuable to the Reich economy. From the
seeds, a base additive was used in preparation of food that was to be stored for
long periods pf time .

countries. .Thi& represents a pure profit as Germany merely -increased her indebtedness to the Bdlkans with no intent of repayment.

70

An opportunity for Germany to test Schacht's New Plan presented itself
when economic sanctions were imposed on Italy by the League of Nations.
sanction was imposed-because o f Italy's aggressive action in Ethiopia .

Yugoslavia,

Italy's main customer in Ssutheastern Europe, chose to obey the sanctions.
sanctions, however, dealt a severe blow to the Yugoslavian economy.

This

The

By choos71

ing to obey the sanctions, Yugoslavia lost 90 per cent of her exports to Italy.
The greatest loss to Yugoslavia was in its timber industry.

Lumber exports to Italy

dropped from 371 million dinars in 1935 to 3 7.3 dinars in less than one year.

72

Yugoslavia, realizing the predicament caused by the loss of its chief
customer, succeeded in gaining a few concessions from Great Britain and France.
Britain's efforts were only half-hearted.

She did allow certain quantities of eggs

from Yugoslavia to enter her country duty-free.

His Majesty's government also

reduced the duty on turkeys and chickens and increased her quota of Yugoslav
bacon.

73

The total value of Britain's concessions to Yugoslavia approached the

^ S ch ach er, p. 163.
7lBasch, p. 192.
72lbid.
7 3 j . n 0 pfrner/ Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-41 (N ew York: Columbia
University Press, 1962), p. 99.

36

neighborhood of 100 million dinars.
France.

74

The Yugoslav government fared worse with

French importers continued to do most of their timber buying from non-'

sanctionist Austria rather than buy timber from Yugoslavia.

The total increase in
75

French purchasing from Yugoslavia amounted to eleven head of horses.

The

total amount of concessions granted by Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, and France
covered no more than 25 per cent of Yugoslavia's export losses.

This meant that

Yugoslav exporters sustained a 500-600 million dinar loss in a single year.

76

The German Foreign O ffice wasted little time in talking advantage of
the opportunities presented by the League sanction.

On March 27, 1936, Carl

77
Clodius

attended an economic conference at Zagreb, Yugoslavia and reported:

The negotiations have led to our reaching an objective
for which we have striven for a year: The Yugoslav govern
ment is now prepared . . . . to undertake a large scale shift
over of total imports and purchases from Germany . . .
This would mean that the German share of Yugoslavia's imports
would rise to more than a third and that the German govern
ment would obtain the predominating position in the Yugoslav
market which Italy held for fifteen years.7®

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
,U;
7^ ’ Basch, p. 193.
7 7 Carl Clodius, head of the Economic Policy Division, Department
of the German Foreign M inistry.
7 8 P . G er. F .P ., "C", V o l. V . , p. 318.

Thd same month, Krupp, the great munitions and steel producers from
Germany, received two separate contracts^

The first contract called for a 160-

million dinar contract to convert the Zenica Iron Works in Bosnia into an armaments
plant.

79

The second contract provided for the manufacture of bridge materials

for an extensive Yugoslav highway project.

80

A t the conference in Zagreb, the

yugoslavian government decided to place orders in Germany for railway materials
.

in order to use up as much of the balance owed to Yugoslav creditors as possible.

81

The most logical and the most practical solution to the problems of
the Reich was for Germany to increase her economic involvement in Southeastern
Europe,

In 1935, therefore, the first of the two I'New Plans, " directed by D r,

Schacht, was initiated.

These plans were designed to take advantage of obvious

weaknesses in the Balkans and, therefore, Germany would be able to capitalize on
the Balkan resources that were vital to the German economy.

The New Plan, in

-effect, was designed to-destroy tbe system of multilateral trade in Europe.
The League of Nation's sanctions against Italy gave Germany its
greatest opportunity to put its trading methods into operation.

This opportunity,

together with the reluctance of the West to concern itself in Balkan affairs,
resulted in the economic capitulation of Yugoslavia,

It also gave Germany a

strategic economic advantage in her drive to gain control of the Southeast.

79

Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International
Affairs, 1936 (London: Oxford University Press, 1931-1941), p. 530,
80 Hoptner, 1934-41.
^ Survey of International Affairs, 1936, p. 530.

CHAPTER III

SCHACHT'S TOUR OF THE BALKANS

The Imposition of economic sanctions on Italy by the League of Nations
changed the scope of the Reich's penetration and exploitation of Southeastern
Europe .
the area.

The League's action facilitated Germany's commercial aspirations in
The Balkan States ceased to be of secondary importance.

Their expan

ded role in the Reich economy became apparent when, in June, 1936, Dr, Schacht
left for a tour of the Balkan capitals as a special emissary of both the Foreign
Ministry and his own Ministry o f Economics.
Dr. Schacht's first stop was Belgrade, Yugoslavia .

The Germans had

far-reaching motives for the tour, as the stop in Belgrade illustrated.

As early as

1933 von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, had outlined a scheme to high
N azi officials calling for extensive financial aid to Yugoslavia in order to gain
political influence there in addition to maintaining it as an important market for
German exports.
In Belgrade, Schacht showed his ability as a negotiator.

....

12, 1936, M iliv je Pilvja

2

.

signed a treaty with Germany, greatly reducing

^ Schacher, p . 147.
9

On June

Yugoslav Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs.

38

39

Yugoslavia's trade with the Netherlands, Great Britain, the United States, and
other countries.

3

These trade restrictions

were advantageous to Germany.
4

The Yugoslav Prime M inister, Milan Stoyadinovitch,
"Today we are inaugurating a new Economic po licy."

said of the agreement;
5

Stoyadinovitch also

agreed to permit Germany to send experts to examine the iron ore deposits of
Lubidja.

The Yugoslav Premier made very clear his intentions of ignoring the

strong anti-German element in his country that had hindered Yugoslav-German
trade relations.^

Charles S . Nelson, the United States Ambassador to Yugoh

■

'

slavia, wrote to the Secretary of State expressing his fear of " , . , Yugoslavia
becoming the economic, and eventual I y, perhaps, the political satellite of
; Germany.

But at the present time, and under present conditions (I can) see no

alternative course for (that) Country . . ."
The agreement provided that Yugoslavia would import only certain
commodities, up to 35 per cent of its import volume, from non-clearing countries.
The purpose was to cut imports from currency and foreign exchange countries and
increase commerce with clearing countries, particularly her greatest clearing
debtor, Germany?

^ Survey of International Affairs, 1936, p . 530.
^Pro-Minister of Foreign A ffairs.
^ Survey of International Affairs, 1936, p. 530,
^Hoptner,p* 101.
7 F.R . of U .S ., 1936, V o l. I . , p , 502.
8 Hoptner, p. 102.
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Germany's endeavors, prompted by the League sanctions, showed
immediate results in connection with Italy.

Italian exports declined from 672

million dinars ($336 million) to 137 million ($66.5 million) from 1935 to 1936-^
Germany's investment in Yugoslavia during the same period rose from 55 million
dinars ($27.5 million) to 820 million ($410 m illion).

10

The fable following on

page 41 (Table 5) illustrates the overalI direction of Yugoslav trade from 1926 1939,
Dr. Schacht's trip to Belgrade resulted in some impressive gains for
Germany.

Above a ll, Italy ceased to be Yugoslavia's largest customer.

In the

first half of 1935, Italy accounted for slightly more than 20 per cent of Yugoslavia's
total tr a d e ,^

Germany only accounted for 16 per cent of Yugoslavia'? trade in

1935 but in the first half of 1936, Italy's share of the trade, as a result of the
League action, slipped to less than two per cent while Germany's share increased
to over 25 per cent,
success of his visit.

12

"When he left Belgrade, Schacht expressed pleasure at the

At their last meeting, Premier Stoyadinovitch related to the

President of the Reichsbank that economic cooperation between Germany and
Yugoslavia entailed his "firm intention of overcoming in the future more

^ Basch, p. 192.
I^Hoptner, p. 102,
1 ISurvey of International Affairs, 1936, p . 531,
12

Ibid.

13
YUGOSLAV EXPORT - IMPORT TRADE WITH SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

1926 - 1939
(annual averages in percentage of value of trade)
1926
Country
France
Great Britain
C z ec hosi ovak ia
Rumania
Greece
Turkey
Austria
Hungary
Italy
Germany
Total
a.
b.

-

1930

1 931

-

1936

1935

-

1939°

Exports

Imports(from)

Exports

Imports (from)

Exports

3 .4
1.3
9.2
..5
7 .7
0 .2
18.9
7 .0
2 5 .8
10.4

4 .3
6 .0
18.2
3 .3
1.3
0 .4
18.2
5 .7
12.2
14.2

2 .4
3 .3
12.8
.6
4 .2
0 .17.9
4 .5
21. 4
14.1

4 .5
8 .6
1 4.3
2 .2
1.3
0.1
13.8
4 .0
12.9
16.0

2 .8
8 .4
10.6
.9
3 .4
° * 2b
n .4 b
4 .2
7 .4
2 8 .3

2 .3
7 .5
10.9
2.1
1.5
0.1
9 .2
3 .4
7 .8
3 4.8

8 4 .4

8 3.8

8 1 .3

7 7 .7

7 7 .6

7 9 .6

Imports (from)

Includesyear of League sanctions against Italy
Does not include 1939

^3 JJJ.Hoptner,

Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-41 ,

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 9 5 -9 6 .

successfully than hitherto the political obstacles in this sphere.
Schacht's second stop was Athens.
caution than his trip to Belgrade .

His visit there required much more

The Reich Minister accurately predicted a

more suspicious press in Athens than he had encountered in Belgrade.

The

Messager d'Athens stated that his trip had more political reasons than economic
motives.

15

Schacht's basis for opening Greco-German trade discussions was

understandable, as Germany was the largest market for Greek exports.

The

exports over the past three years indicated that Greece had a favorable balance
of approximately 30 million Rm.-($12 m illion).

16

Schacht's goal lay primarily in the stimulation of non-agricultural
undertakings in Greece.

The Reich faced its sternest competition in Greece

from Great Britain, and the German emissary presented a plan whereby the Reich
would match British investments in Thracian ore mining.

Germany, he stated,

was willing to provide the capital and labor in return for a share of the holdings.

17

Schacht's "package-deal" called fpr the placing of larger orders for

manufactured goods from the Reich.

The Greeks refused to negotiate until

Schacht granted two concessions; 1) a guarantee against any accumulation of

1 4 D . G e r . F . P . "C ", Vol . V , p. 631.
^Schacher, p. 227.
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debts on Germany's part, and 2) a guarantee against depreciation of the
Reichmark.^®
As a result of the negotiations, at the beginning of 1937, a 230-million
drachma (^33 mill ion) loan from Germany at three per cent interest was granted
19
to aid in the Greek rearmament program.

Schacht's visit succeeded in that

it laid the groundwork fora steady increase in trade between the two countries.
Between 1930 and 1938, Greek exports to Germany increased from 23.-5 to 38,8
per cent of the total from Germany rose from 10.1 to 2 8 .8 per cent of Greece's
total im ports.^
Schacht's progress in obtaining economic gains for Germany was chal
lenged somewhat at Bucharest, his third stop in the Balkans.

O f all the Balkan

countries, Rumania provided the most ardent resistance to German economic
encroachment.

Rumania held out a year longer than the other Balkan countries
21

in accepting exchange controls,

because she had a consistent export surplus

and an adequate supply of gold in the Rumanian National Bank.

22

The

^Schacher, p. 172.
^Edward S. Forster, A Short History of Modern Greece, 1821-1956
(New York: Frederick A . Praeger, 1958), p . 195.
4 Bickham Sweet-rEscott, Greece, A Political and Economic Survey,
1939-1953, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954), p. 12,
21
trade.

Another term applied to the German economic policies concerning

44

foremost task of the economic leaders in Rumania lay in the preservation of the
value of the Lei.

In the end, like her sister states, she succumbed to the insur

mountable obstacles of foreign credit withdrawals, falling prices, and frozen
debts in other countries.

23

However, both internal and external political

events affected economic policy.
Nicholas Titulescu's
ance

24

foreign policy was concerned with the mainten

of close connections with France and the Little Entente against

Germany.

His chief fear, the loss of land gained from the post-war-settlements,

called for a pro-French policy against any form of treaty revision .
ties between Rumania and France tightened.

25

Economic

In February, France succeeded in

gaining a commercial agreement with Rumania that stated that, in return for
French armaments, the Rumanian government would grant France 750,000 tons
of Rumanian oil per annum for a period of twelve years.

26

However, in July, 1936, Titulescu resigned his post.

27

The departure

of the pro-French Prime Minister greatly facilitated the Reich's efforts towards

^B asch, p. 139.
n

i

Rumanian Prime Minister, Pro-French,
^ H e n ry Roberts, Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), p. 190.
^ Survey of International Affairs, 1936, p. 532.
^Titulescu's resignation stemmed from mounting pressure from rightist
groups because of his pro-Russian policies, See; John A . Lukacs, The Great
Powers"and Eastern Europe (New York: American Book Company, 1953), p. 72.

45

gainful negotiations.
favored H itler;

King Carol, theRumanian Monarch-Dictator, openly

His entire piplicy was summed up by the following statement:

. . . The immense (sic) of-Russia was always bearing upon
her (Rumania) and she had to withstand it as best as she could,
Russia was, so to speak, the hereditary enemyt ^®
In the place of Titulescue, Victor Antonescu

29

became the new Prime Minister.

One of his chief aims was to improve relations with Poland which had deteriora
ted because o f Titulescu's pro-Russian attitude.
ment in the German Rumanian relations.

This resulted in an improve-

30

The ascendency of Antonescu resulted in some commercial advantages
for the Reich.
armaments.

At the close of 1936, Rumania signed contracts for German

The two countries also agreed upon the construction of an 800-

million lei ($64 million) steelworks plant, subsidized by the Reich.

31

Through

out 1936, however, Rumania still remained financially independent of Germany
because Rumania's chief export product, o il,

32

sold reaily on the world market.

In September of 1936, Germany and Rumania concluded an economic agreement
concerning Germany's share o f Rumanian petroleum exports.

The meeting

Cited in Roberts, Rumania, p. 190,
99

Antonescu was, at the time of his appointment, the Minister of Finance.

3 0 D .G e r. F .P .

"C", V o l. V , , p. 957.

31 Ibid.
3^ In 1937, petroleum production accounted for 40 per cent of Rumanian
exports. In respect to its effect on the national economy, o il, including d rill
ing processing and transporting, made up 15 per cent of the total national budget
receipts. See: S .E .E ., p. 128.
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exemplified the independence of Rumania.

The negotiations ended with the

following agreement:
“With effect from October 1, 1936, German purchases
of mineral oil and its derivatives . , . are only to be
paid for under the provisions of the Clearing Agreement
as long as the amounts paid in . . . each calendar
quarter do not total mote than 25 per cent of dll amounts
paid during the preceding calendar quarter . ,...33
The main advantage that Germany had over Rumania lay in her ability
to supply markets for Rumanian products that were difficult to sell elsewhere.

34

In 1937, Germany purchased 6 1 .2 per cent of Rumania's corn exports, over
5 ,7 per cent of her barley, 21 per cent of her rye and eight per cent of her
wheat.

35

This gave Germany an opportunity to advance her economic exploi

tation of Rumania.
economy.

The Reich now began a slow infiltration into the Rumanian

A t the end of 1936, a large German industrial network, I . G .

Farben, built large soya bean and other fodder producing oleaginous plants in
Rumania.

36

peasants.

The firms also concluded contracts with 70,000 - 100,000
The contracts provided for the sale of the peasants' soya crops to

German purchasers at a pre-determined price.

The total acreage of soya bean

33S .E .E . , p. 135.
3^ P , G e r. F.P.: " C ', V o l. V . , p. 1004.
3^Roberts, p. 216.
3 6

Basch, p. 192.
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crops jumped from 1,465 h a .^ in 1936 -to ever 97,000 ha. in 1 9 3 7 .^ '

In

return, I . G . Farben exported chemicals, dyes, and Factory equipment to
Rumania from their German plants.

As 1938 approached, as far as the Third

Reich was concerned, Rumania remained the Balkan area's most economically
independent nation.
39
Schacht's fourth and final stop was in Sophia in m id-July.
with much less resistance here than he had encountered in Rumania.

He met
O f all

the Balkan States, Bulgaria represented the easiest target for ecqnomic exploit
tat ion by Germany.

As early as 1934, German joint stock companies had

organized such companies as Hansa, Trakia, and Nova Maledonia in Bulgaria.
These Bulgarian companies were run by offices inside G e rm a n y .^

The sole

purpose of these companies was to export Bulgarian agricultural and mining pro
ducts to the Reich.
The political events within Bulgaria afforded great opportunities for
the extension of the N azi economy within Bulgaria.
of 1935 within Bulgaria left Georgi Kiosseivqnov

37

41

A coup d'etat in November
as the Premier, and Boris

ha. is an abbreviation for hectare (2.47 acres).

S^Basch, p .

19],

39

° When the term final stop is used, it concerns only the countriesdealt
with in this thesis. A ctually, Bulgaria was his second to the last stop as he pro
ceeded to Ankara, Turkey.

Bulgaria

Kosseu, H . Hristov and D . Angelov, A Short History of
(Sophia--: Foreign Language Press, 1963), p . 361.
^ Long-time friend of King Boris, Chief of Court Chancellery .

48

now was in complete control of the Bulgarian government

42

The success of

Boris was a decided economic advantage for Germany.
The emergence of a monarchist-fascist government in Bulgaria caused
a considerable change in its foreign policy.

This in turn caused a pronounced

withdrawal of Western investments in Bulgaria (mainly French and Belgian).

43

Bulgaria's export products supplemented Germany's economy rather
than competing with it.

Cereals, fruits, eggs, hides, and tobacco were the

main crops in Bulgarian agriculture.

44

Bulgaria's climate was also suitable for

the cultivation of soya beans, a product that was needed by Germany.

The

soya bean crop acreage increased from 2500 ha. in 1934 to 17,000 ha. in
1937.

45

From 1934 to 1937, Bulgaria's cotton production trebled while her

exports of finished goods to the Reich quadrupled.

46

Also a Revisionist State, Bulgaria's growing dependence upon N azi
Germany did not bother her as it did some of the other Balkan countries.

47

In

42

In the interlude between Georgiev and Kiosseivanov, the govern
ment was run by the corrupt and inept administration of Andrei Toshev.
43

Stanley C . Evans, A Short History of Bulgaria
andWisehart, Ltd., I960), p. 173.
44

(London: Lawrence

Kossev, Hristov, Angelos, p, 361.

^B asch, p. 187.
^ G r e a t Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, p. 192.
^ S u rv e y of International Affairs, 1936, p. 531.

June of 1936, Dr. Schacht talked of a Bulgarian economic isolation from the
rest of the Balkan nations.

48

In November of 1937, 'Walter Funk informed

Prime Minister Kiossevianov of Germany's willingness to purchase as much as
Bulgaria wished to sell.

The Reich also agreed to increase Bulgaria's import

quotas in raw materials, coffee, and tobacco for a period of up to twelve
years.

49
In 1933, one-third of Bulgaria's exports went to Germany.

50

By

mid-1936, the corresponding figure approximated 63 per cent, while Bulgarian
imports from the Reich reached a level of about 54 per cent of her total imports.
Germany purchased 40
tobacco, by 1936.

per cent of Bulgaria's greatest agricultural crop,

51

Dr. Schacht's tour of the four Balkan States succeeded in accomplish
ing two profitable advantages for Germany: favorable economic negotiations
for Germany with each nation, and an increase in the dependency of the Balkan
countries upon Germany.
Undoubtedly, the restrictive measures undertaken by the League of
Nations made the Reich's economic endeavors infinitely simpler.

^ E van s, p. 173.

The action

50

prompted immediate negotiations with Yugoslavia, heretofore an accepted
Italian sphere of interest.
"World events were soon to greater facilitate Germany's economic
drive into Southeastern Europe.

Developments elsewhere in Europe, such as

the Anschluss and the aftermath of Munich, figured decisively in the immedi
ate future of the Balkan States.

CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECT OF THE ANSCHLUSS A N D THE OCCUPATION OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA O N THE BALKAN STATES

; In 1938, the Balkan States as well as the rest of the world witnessed
an abrupt change in the demeanor of the Third Reich.

Outright annexation

appeared to be Germany's newly adapted modus operandi.

The German army

crossed the Austrian border, under Hitler's orders, on March 12, 1938.

The

2
Anschluss,

in addition to giving the Nazis economic gains, also gave the

Germans a valuable advantage by improving both their geographical and po liti
cal position vis a vis the Balkan countries.

The Anschluss showed, too, a lack

of either initiative or desire by the Western Powers to intervene in the affairs of
Southeastern Europe.

The Great Powers adopted a wait-and-see attitude upon

hearing the news of the Anschluss.

On March 12, Ambassador Dieckhoff wrote

to Berlin that M r . -Hull:
. . . was obviously thoroughly impressed by the (Anschluss)
proclamation. He thanked me for the information. From

^Wilhelm Keitel, (Ed. by Walter G o rlitz), The Memoirs of Field
Marshall Keitel (New York; Stein and Day, 1966), p. 59.
2

A loose translation of Anschluss is the word Union: This was forbidden
by the Treaty of S t. Germain. It was designed in 1938 to stop Dr. Schuschnigg
from holding a plebescite to determine Austria's direction
51
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the few questions that he asked, it was apparent that
he thoroughly understands our action.^
In Rome, Lord Perth

4

concurred with Ciano's

5

statement about the

Anschluss. 'There is nothing to do . . . we cannot force the people to be
independent if they do not wish to be so."

6

Mussolini was on a skiing vaca

tion when he heard the news, and proclaimed that the acquisition of Austria by
Germany was inevitable.7
The European countries in the-Southeast received the news of the
Anschluss with mixed emotions.

On March 11, the day before the N azi coup,

Stoyadinovitch discussed the situation with Arthur Bliss Lane.

8

jn his conver

sation with Lane, Stoyadinovitch spoke harshly against France and Great
.9
Britain's hesitancy to be involved in the whole a ffair.

As far as retaliation

O

John A . Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe (New York:
The American Book Company, 1958), p. 121, A Iso sees : D .G e r. F. P, , " D",
Vol . 1 . , p. 616.
^ Lord Earl o f Perth, Sir Eric Drummond, British Ambassador to Italy,
formerly Secretary General to the League o f Nations.
^ Italian Foreign Minister,
- D . Brit. F.P . , Third Series, V o l. I . , p. 28.
7 S .E .E ., p. 47.
®U n ite d Sta tes Ambassado r to Yugo si a v ia .
9

Stoyadinovitch believed that if M r, Eden had accepted the Italian
position in Ethiopia, and thereby gained Italy as an a lly , Germany would not
dare; to move against Austria . See: Schacher, Germany Pushes Southeast,
p. 214.
' ‘
^
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by Yugoslavia was concerned, he stated that; "There will be no troop move. '
.
.
10
ments in Yugoslavia . . . Yugoslavia remains with her arms folded."

The

Stoyadinovitch government, however, did more than remain in a neutral posi
tion.

The instructions issued to the border guards commanded them to cooperate

with the German troops that were now being stationed across the lin e .

A request

sent to Berlin asked the Reich to guarantee the security of the frontier of
11
Yugoslavia .

Hitler responded with the announcement that Germany had no

aims beyond Austria, and made the statement that: "We (Germany) are lucky
in having here such frontiers that we were relieved of the trouble of defending
them m ilitarily."

12

On March 14, Stoyadinovitch publicly declared that

Yugoslavia was not concerned with Austrian events.

13

The general staff in Yugoslavia now began to consider its precarious
position.

Germany needed Yugoslav compliance if it was to succeed in its

efforts toward domination of Southeastern. Europe.

The position of the Reich

army on that country's northern border made it possible for Germany to increase
her military and economic pressure on Yugoslavia.

Another factor that

Yugoslavia had to consider was the appeasement policy of Great Britain and
France. ^

10F.R . of U .S ., 1938, V o l. .I., p. 431.
n D .G e r ,F .P . , "D ", V o l. V . , p . 184.
1 2 I . M . T ., (Doc. 2 7 1 9 ,-PS).
^Lukacs, p. 120,
^Schacher, p. 218.
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The Anschluss also was interpreted as an ominous warning by the remain
ing Balkan States.

The presence of Germany, which now occupied the strategic

position in the Danube V a lley , sent the Balkan countries into a flurry of diplomatic discussions.

15

'With the possession of Austria/ N azi Germany now had

military and economic control as well as ready access to Southeastern Europe by
road, river transportation, and ra ilw a y s .^

The Balkan governments now sought

the friendship of Bulgaria, and that of Hungary, if it could be achieved.
A Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression was signed between Bulgaria
and members of the Little Entente

on July 31, 1938.

Under the terms of the

treaty, the arms limitation imposed by the Treaty of N eu illy

18

was abrogated.

From this point on, however, the talks became distinctly reminiscent of the
abortive Balkan Conferences.
ances.

Bulgaria refused to discard its territorial griev

The extent of the Bulgar concessions was an agreement towards settle

ment of disputes through arbitration.

No decisions were reached concerning

the settlement of the revisionist questions.

19

The Bulgarian Government refused

to enter the Balkan Entente without specific guarantees concerning the revision
of her fro n tie r.^

15S „ E .E .,.p , 47.
16 Ibid..
^ Hoptner,
1Q

•S ee Chapter I , , p?

19S.E .E ., p. 48, fn. 1.

20 D . G er. F»P. , " D V V o l . V I . , N o . 167, p. 327.

Bulgaria went a step further against her sister States than she had in
the early Thirties. -She solicited the aid of the Reich.

The Bulgarian Foreign

Minister gave orders to his Minister in Berlin that he was to offer Germany his
country’s economic and political cooperation in return for recognition of
Bulgarian territorial demands.

21

Once again, revisionist disputes thwarted ah

attempt towards Balkan unity.
• Germany's annexation of Austria aided the Reich economically.

The

reserves of gold and foreign assets in the Austrian National Bank amounted to
approximately RM. 248 m illion.
private holdings of foreign assets.
German Government.

This was in addition to an unknown amount of
These funds were of great importance to the

The Reich's total balance of gold and foreign exchange

in the Reich Bank had dwindled to a mere RM. 77 million ($30.5 m illion).

22

The Austrian surplus of dairy products also helped to relieve Germany's shortage
of these products and, in fact, increased the Reich's supply by 19 per cent.

23

The incorporation of Austria by Germany resulted in a 54 per cent increase in
Germany's timber supply.

24

Up to this time, Germany had suffered from a

shortage of manpower because of the increase in the size of the German Army.
The Anschluss rectified this situation as w ell.

The number of unemployed

21 Ibid
22

League, W .E .S ., 1938/1939, p. 217.

2 3 League, W .E .S ., 1937/1938, p . - 184,
2 4 League, W .E .S ., 1938/1939, p. 218.
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persons in Austria Fell from 351,000 in May of 1938 to a total of 59,000 in May
of 1939.

The reason for this great decrease in unemployment was the Austrian

workers' access to immediate employment in German factories.

25

The annexation of Austria resulted in a great decrease in the German
debt in the Balkan countries.
in the Balkans.

26

Austria, unlike the Reich, had extensive credits

Germany's total indetedness to the Balkans declined from

RM. 567 million ($140 million) in March of 1935 to RM. 250 million ($62
million) in March of 1938.

27

In addition to this, Austria also had investments

in banks in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Rumania.

The value of these invest28

ments was approximately RM . 65 million ($12 million).

On September 29, 1938, the Four Powers, France, Great Britain,
Italy and Germany, agreed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia at Munich.
Czechoslovakia was not invited to the conference nor was she consulted on the
decisions that were made there .

The only part that Czechoslovakia played as

2^ Ibid.
^Basch, p. 205.
2^ Survey of International Affairs, 1938, V o l. 11 ., p. 48.
28

It must be pointed out that the relationship between banking and
industry was far more direct in this part of the world as compared to the United
States. Hence, control of a bank's securities meant much more than a country
owning investments in American banks. European banks of the period were much
more independent of their respective governments than were their American
counterparts.
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a result of this conference was her acceptance of her surrender at 2:15 a .m . on
September 30.

“When the draft was presented to the Foreign Minister of

Czechoslovakia, Kamil Krofta, he accepted it and made the following statement:
"The president and the government submit to the conditions of the Munich Agreement which has come into being without Czechoslovakia and against her."

29

Less thpn six months later, on the night of March 14 and 15, 1939, German
troops occupied Prague.
The occupation of Czechoslovakia was highly profitable for the Reich
in terms of economics.

At the end of 1938, the reserves of gold and foreign

assets In the National Bank of Czechoslovakia approximated RM. 275 m illion.
These funds did not include the private holdings and government securities that
were being held in foreign banks.
a

In addition to this, Czechoslovakia held

TO million ($49.6 million) credit against Great Britain.

31

Because of the

Munich Conference, Czechoslovakia also became a powerless, lifeless satellite
of the Reich.
As a result of Germany's activity in Zaechoslovakia, the Balkan countries were reluctant to do anything which might turn the Reich against them.

29

32

The Economist, May 14, 1938, p. 355.

30
' , Radamir Luza, The Transfer of the Sudetan - Germans; A Study of
Czech-German Relations, 1933-1962 (New York: New York University Press,
1964), p. 150. 1
31 League, W .E ;S ., 1938/1939, p. 217.
32 Ibid.
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This hesitancy had a great deal to do with the economic situation now facing
Southeastern Europe.

Nearly a third of the Balkan countries' export trade had

been with Austria and Czechoslovakia before their annexation.

33

Czechoslovakia also had a large credit balance in various countries
which totaled kc. 2 .3 8 billion ($595,000,000)

34

At least k c . 500 million

($125 million) of that amount were balances in the countries of Southeastern
Europe.

These balances immediately fell under the control of Germany.

35

In addition, Czechoslovakia had a great many investments in Southeastern
Europe, such as the textile industries of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary;
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria's sugar

industry; the Hungarian and Yugoslav glass

industry; and investments in the Banks of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
Czechoslovakia's private and governmental capital in Yugoslavia approximated
nearly 775 million dinars ($385 million), or about 18 per cent of the total foreign
investments in Yugoslavia.

36

The Reich also gained control of about 14 per

cent of the foreign capital in Bulgaria.

37

3 3 Basch, p. 206.
34lbid.
35lb id ., p. 209.
36

Great Britain and France followed with 14 and 17 per cent, respec-

tively <
3 ^Basch,

p. 208.
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Following occupation of Prague, Germany continued to increase her
trade with the Balkans.

The Reich continued to pay higher prices for Balkan

produce than the Balkan countries could obtain on the free world market.

38

Germany's economic situation was also helped by her territorial gainsT Bulgaria,
which was now completely dependent upon Germany, proved to be no obstacle
in Germany's aim f ° r control of Southeastern Europe.

39

40
Shortly after attending the conference a t Munich, Dr. Funk
went to
several of the Balkan capitals as D r. Schacht had done in June of 1936,
first visit was to Belgrade.

His

His first proposal stated that Germany was willing

to buy one-half of Yugoslavia's goods in exchange for a Yugoslav promise to
purchase a predetermined amount of German goods.

41

Yugoslavia momentarily

resisted this offer, but weakened when the Reich offered to buy 125,000 tons of
Yugoslavian w h e a t a t 155 dinars ($72) per ton as compared to Great Britain's
price of 53 dinars ($27.50) per ton.

42

Rumania, always conscious of Hungary's revisionist aims concerning
Transylvania, sought the favor of the Reich.

For this reason, the Rumanian

3 8 League, W .E ,S ., 1938/1939, p. 204,
^-Schacher, p. 274,
Dr. Walter Funk was Schacht's successor as Minister Of Economics in
November, 1937 and was President of the Reichbank in January of 1939. Funk
was later convicted at Nuremberg and sentenced to life imprisonment,
^ T h e Economist, November 5, 1938, p. 263.
^S urvey of International Affairs, 1938, V o l I I . , p. 61,
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Government hesitated to do anything that Germany might interpret as against
its own interests.4 ^

The German interest in Rumania centered on its need for

o il.
Owing to Rumania's precarious position, the negotiations were
quickly completed.

In December, 1938, Germany and Rumania signed an

agreement which provided for a 50 per cent increase in the oil trade between
the two countries for the following year.

44

The proviso also stipulated that

the value of the commodities traded would be equal, preventing Germany
from increasing its debit balance in Rumania.

45

Germany also agreed to

increase her petroleum purchases frpm Rumania by 20 to 25 per cent over
1938.46
The commercial policy of Great Britain and France was an important
reason for Germany's steady increase in trade with the countries in South
eastern Europe.

In the fall of 1938, delegations from Rumania and Bulgaria

had gone to London in an attempt to seek aid from Great Britain to rescue
47
their countries from strangulation by the German trading practices.

Prime

Minister Chamberlain summed up Great Britain's policy towards Southeastern

4 3 S .E .E ./ p. 52.
44
45

Basch, p. 211.
Survey of International Affairs, 1938, V o l. V I I . , p. 56.
Basch, p. 211.

4 ^Schacher,

p. 231.
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Europe in a speech to the House of Commons at the beginning of Novembers
Great Britain was not attempting to prevent Germany's
commercial expansion in this (sic) part of the world.
Geographically, Germany must occupy a dominating
position there . . . so far as this country is concerned,
we have no wish to block Germany out from those
countries or encircle her economically,
Britain's trade problem with the Danubian and Balkan States was one of
quantity.

The Balkan countries were able only to export annually

(approximately $35 million) in goods to Great Britain
($240 million)

50

49

whereas

7 million

48 million

were needed for the Balkan exports to be of any value in

Britain's economy.

It was not feasible for Great Britain to increase Balkan

purchases for several reasons.

Such a policy would have upset a long established
51

trade balance with her regular customers.
Another obstacle was-Great Britain's hesitancy to buy goods in bulk
quantities as Germany did.

52

Great Britain did agree, however, to buy

53
400,000 tons of wheat from Rumania in September, 1938.

The following month,

Great Britain purchased 200,000 tons of wheat for storage.

This fact illustrates

48

House of Commons.

Parliamentary Debates, November 1, 1938,

pp. 67-68.
49
Austria and Czechoslovakia are excluded since by this time they were
under German control.
^^The Economist, November 5, 1938, p . 266.
51 Ib id., p .-267.

^ Basch, p.
53

Ibid.

212

.
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the inability of Great Britain to provide a permanent market for Balkan pur
chases.

Sporadic purchasing could provide no alternative to the need for

fixed markets on the part of the Balkan countries, regardless of the size of the
transaction.

The Balkan countries needed a steady and permanent customer,

a customer who would buy regularly and who would provide competition for
Germany's purchases.
Germany.

54

Also, the trade policy of Great Britain differed from

W hile Germany bought as a single purchasing unit, the private

enterprise system enjoyed in Great Britain prevented the government from
interference in trade direction (except in cases of stock-pile purchases).
fourth and decisive factor was the price.

A

The Balkans were still unable to pro

duce as cheaply as the western countries.
Except for her purchase of oil from Rumania and her purchases of ore
from Yugoslavia, France was at no time a large customer of the Balkan countries.
In 1937, the French imports from the Balkans never exceeded four per cent of
55
the total export trade of the two countries.

France imported grains only when

her own yields were inadequate.
In 1938, Germany no .longer faced the problem of gaining ascendency
in the Balkans.

That was already accomplished.

Now the problem became

how the Balkan area could best fulfill the demands of Germany.

56

^ S ch ach er, p. 252,
^ Survey of International Affairs, 1938, V o l. I I . , p. 66.
^B asch, p. 216.

The

Anschluss and occupation of Prague revealed the Reich's change in modus
operand)’ .

Germany began to s w itc h from economic penetration in the Balkans

and initiated outright territorial annexation of states neighboring the Balkan
countries.

The chief purpose of the economic involvement of Germany in the

Balkans had been to form a German hinterland.

By doing this, Germany could

then make herself as self-sufficient as possible anchro longer be dependent upon
the rest of the world.

At a Nuremberg Party Rally

in 1938, Goring stated that

the most important part of the Four Year Plan was to ensure that the German
people would always have food, even if Germany were completely surrounded
57

by enemies and engaged in a war which would last for thirty years.
The occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia now placed Germany in
the position of being able to dictate commercial agreements rather than merely
negotiate them.

By reflecting upon the role of the Western Powers concerning

Austria and Czechoslovakia, the Balkan countries could clearly see the political
risks involved if they refrained from acquiescing to N azi demands.
By the end of 1938, the Reich, having gained predominance over
Central and Southeastern Europe, was able to secure a steady and reliable supply
of agricultural products.

The percentages of the world total of agricultural pror-

ducts available to the Reich are listed in the table on the following page:

^ S u r v e y of International A ffa irs , 1938, V o l , I I , , p . 3 .
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Table

6

Agricultural Production in Central and Southeastern Europe
t

(In Percentage o f World Production)

Country

Wheat Corn Oats Barley Rye

Sugar
beets

Tobacco Wool Flax Hemp

0.1

1.2

0.1

0 .4

3.1

0 .8

0 .4

0 .4

12.2

0 .8

0 .9

0 .8

1.4

6 .6

1.1

1.4

0 .4

1.7

1.1

1,1

0 .8

0 .4

0 .2

0 .7

0 .5

0.1

0 .2

0 .6

0.1

2 .8

0 .5

9 .3

9.7 17.8

1.4

1.1

4 .2

7 .6

5.1

8 .7 2 5 .9

Austria

0 .3

0 .2

0 .6

0 ,7

1.2

1 .8

Czechoslo
vakia

1.1

0 .3

1.9

3 .0

3 .5

4.7

0 .6

Hu ngary

1.6

2 .4

0 .5

1.7

1.6

1.3

Yugoslavia

1.8

4 .5

0 .5

1.0

0 .5

Rumania

2 .9

4 .0

0 .7

1.9

Bulgaria

1.3

0 .7

0 .1

Greece

0 .6

0 .3

Germany

3 .3

0.1

12.9

12.5

Total

17.9

13.8 19.4 26.1 28.1

1.7

By A p ril, 1939, economic policy and foreign policy in Southeastern
Europe blended to form one and the same program.

The immediate result of this

program was the emergence of Danubia and the Balkans as German dependencies.
There was no Great Power in Western Europe that was willing to assist the smaller
and weaker countries in Southeastern Europe in their fight against the totalitarian
aggression by Germany.

Basch, p. 230.
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The smaller countries, although they did try to establish commercial
intercourse with the rest of the world, had little alternative but to turn to
Germany.

Once trade with the totalitarian Reich occupied a large proportion
i

of their commerce, there was no possibility of maintaining free trade elsewhere.

59 Ib id ., p . .225.

CHAPTER V

THE M ILITARY O C C U P A TIO N OF THE BALKANS

If the year 1938 proved to the Balkans (as well as to the rest of the
world) to be an ominous warning as to Germany's future activities, the early
events of 1939 did nothing to ease those apprehensions.
Reich swallow the remainder of Czechoslovakia.^

Mid-March saw the

Germany's sweeping dip

lomatic successes at Munich and its culmination in the occupation of Prague
awakened the Balkans to the folly in their hope that the Western Democracies
were likely to put a stop to N azi aggression in Central and Southeastern Europe.
In view of French and British reluctance to honor their guarantees while follow
ing a policy, of appeasement, the Balkan States held little faith in the value of
the Western European countries as guarantors of their own sovereignty.

It was

with this air of misgivings that Greece and Rumania received British and French
guarantees on April 13, 1939.

2

James E. MeSherry, Stalin, Hitler and Europe, The Origin of
World War II (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1968), p. 121.

2

Stavrianos., p. 746. Given to Rumania and Greece by Great
Britain and France, it was a unilateral guarantee of independence. It was
also a move of retal iation to Mussolini's move into Albania one week earlier.
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The most significant diplomatic development of the year, one that
would directly concern not only Southeastern Europe but the rest of the world
as w ell, occurred on August 23, 1939.

N azi Germany entered into a non3

aggression treaty with the Soviet Union.

That Hitler's diplomatic coup cast

a foreboding cloud on the safety of the Balkan States was hinted at by the
Fuehrer's address to his military leaders as Ribbentrop was about to sign the
pact with Stalin:
"I have decided to go with Stalin . . . . . Stalin and I
are the only ones who see only the future. So I shall
shake hands with Stalin in a few weeks on the common
German ^Russian border and undertake with him a new
distribution of the world.
The Nazi-Soviet interpretation of "new distribution" was not long
concealed from the rest of the world as the morbid drama of 1939 revealed itself.
On September 1, 1939, the German Army crossed the Polish border to settle all
disputes between the two countries.
the: map of Europe.

Within a month, Poland disappeared from

5

^ Nazi: Soviet Relations, 1939-41, pp. 7 2 -7 5 .
^ Lukacs, p. 245 . By terms of a secret protocol, signed jointly with
the published pact, the Reich agreed to remain uninvolved while Russia repos
sessed the Rumanian province of Bessarabia. For an account of the secret pro
tocol, see also: Stavrianos, The Balkans, p. 747.
**The length of time quoted here is subject to debate . While the
offensive's success was apparent within a week's time, the government fled into
Rumania on the 18th and the Warsaw Garrison surrendered on the 28th. Stronger
contingents of the army held out until October 5 . For an excel lent account of
the Polish campaign see: B.H . Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War
(New York: G .P . Putnams Sons, 1970), p. 31.
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Great Britain and France, even in breaking with their policy of
appeasement with their declaration o f war on ■Germany, were unable to prevent
Poland's dismemberment.

The world sat back, watched Poland overrun, and

braced itself for whatever the uncertain future would bring.

However, the

following five months produced little activity as Germany and the two Western
European powers were locked in a "phony w a r.11^
On April 8, 1940, the five-month deceptive lull ended with the N azi
assault on Norway
Norway,

8

1

The Fuehrer, not waiting until the official capitulation of

.
9
began his sweep through the Low Countries and France on May 10.

On May 15, the Dutch Army surrendered; the night of the 27th and 28th saw

With the situation in Poland under control, the Fuehrer had ordered
an immediate attack begun on the Netherlands, Belgium and France to begin
on November 12. However, the German generals convinced Hitler to postpone
the attack. For an account of Hitler's successive postponements, see:
Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 643-652.
^ The purpose of the violation of the Norwegian neutrality was the
vital necessity for the Reich to maintain a winter route (along the Norwegian
coast) open for transportation o f Swedish iron ore. See: Eugene Anderson,
Modern Europe in World Perspective, 1914 to the Present (New York: Holt
Rinehart and Winston, 1958), p. 530.
g
A llied forces were evacuated from Narvik on June 7 , 1941. On
that same date, the King and his government left for Great Britain. For an
excellent account of the battle for control of Norway, see: : Hart, The Second
World W ar, pp. 51-63.
9

Winston S . Churchill, The Second World War: The Gathering
Storm, V o !. I (Boston: The Houghton M ifflin Company, 1948), p f 662.
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the Belgians capitulate.

10

By June 4 , British forces had fled the continent.

The most shocking events were happening in France, however.

11

The world

reacted with disbelief at the ease with which the "mightiest nation on the
European continent," France, disintegrated before the German onslaught.

On

June 10, the French Government left Paris, and on June 14, that city was occupied by the German Eighteenth Army.
the mercy of Adolf H itler.

12

Indeed, at m id -1940, Europe was at

The general feeling was that Hitler had won the

w ar.

As the war progressed, even during the early stages, the importance
of Southeastern Europe to the Reich took on even greater dimensions.

As early

as 1935, N azi officials had realized the Balkan nations would be their best
source of supplies.

They also realized that the Balkan nations would be the

easiest for Germany to defend in case of war.

13

^Anderson, p. 531.
11 Ibid.
12Shirer, p. 738.
13

Burton H . Klein, Germany's Economic Preparation for War
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 59. The German drive into
Poland was complemented by the drive of the Russians into the Baltic. The
activity in the area removed all possibility of establishing a northern front by
the Allies against Germany. The end of the Finnish War closed the northern
part of Europe to A llied access.
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A llied military preparations at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
caused considerable concern among members of the N azi High Command.

In

February, 1940, the British and French troops in the eastern Mediterranean
numbered over 500,000.

In view of this fact, British and French officials con

sidered three alternatives that would be open to H itler.
1.
2.
3.

Hitler could attack in the West.
. Hitler might go southeast into the Balkans.
Hitler might go east against Russia in order to obtain

"Lebensraum, V food and o i l.

14

It Was real ized early that if one or more of the Balkan Nations, par
ticularly Greece, could form an alliance with Turkey, a southeastern front
15
might be opened up against Germany.
Balkan interest was Rumania.

The focal objective of Germany's

Rumania's chief product, o il, was of vital impor-

tance to Germany's war production .

16

O f a ll the Balkan countries, Rumania

most successfully had maintained her self-determination against the German
economic onslaught.

As a result of this, Rumania was able to continue the

^ S ir Edmund Ironside, The Ironside Diaries, 1937-1940
Constuble and Company, Ltd., 1962), p. 111.

(London:

15

Sir 'Winston C hurchill, The Grand AI liance (Boston: Houghton,
M ifflin Company, 1950), p. .4.

Edgar Me Innis, The War, V o ). I (London: Oxford University
Press, 1945., p. 172.
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sale of her valuable products fo the western countries.
Rumanian oil intensified.

17

The competition for

In December of 1939, Germany and Rumania signed

an agreement in which Rumania promised to deliver 130,000 tons of oil per
month to the Reich.

18

O f this amount, however, only 26,000 tons of oil

actually was received by Germany because 80 per cent of Rumania's oil industry
was owned by Great Britain and France.

1

9 *
Early in the war, the Allies rea-

lized the importance of curtailing Germany's supply of Rumanian o i l .

20

Owing

to this, early competition between the Reich and the "West raised the price of
21

Rumanian oil from $17 to $44 per ton.
The early success of the German Army in Europe gave the Reich an
overwhelming advantage in her dealings with the Balkan States.

The N a z i-

Soviet Pact, together with the ease with which the German onslaught had'over
run five successive European countries, left no doubt on the part of the Balkans
as to the dangers of alienating the Fuehrer.

W ith France's col lapse and the

British evacuation of the continent, Rumania was more affected than the rest of
the Balkan States.

Its guarantee by the West was useless.

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ib id ., p. 207.
Winston Spencer Ghurchill, Memoirs o f the Second World War
(Boston: Houghton-Miff I in C o . , 1959), p. 206.
2 lM cln n is, V o l. I . , p . 119.

For the Balkans, (again particularly Rumania), another problem doubly
jeopardized their position— the presence of the Soviet Union on their border.
The N azi successes were doing nothing to sate Stalin’s appetite to share in the
spoils.

Rumania, only too mindful of Russia's Bessarabian aims, especially saw

the gravity of the situation.

As was dreaded, France's collapse did not long

precede Soviet movements to entrench themselves in Southeastern Europe.
On June 23, 1940, Molotov

22

told Schulenberg

23

t h a t" . . .

Rumania had done nothing to bring about-a solution of the Bessarabian problem.
Therefore, something would have to be done . . . .

The Soviet government was

still striving for a peaceful solution, but it was determined to use force, should
the Rumanian government decline a peaceful agreement."

24

Three days later, on June 26, 1940, the Soviet Government issued an
ultimatum to Rumania, demanding not only Bessarabia but parts of Bukovina within
twenty-four hours.

22

25

Germany advised Rumania to accept the Russian demands.

26

Vyacheslav M . Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs from 1939-

1949.
23

Friedrich "Werner (Count von der), German Ambassador to the
Soviet Union, 1934-1941.
24

N azi Soviet Relations, p . 155.

oc
(V o l. II)

Winston S. Churchil I, The Second World Wars Their Finest Hour
(Boston; Houghton M ifflin Company, 1949), p. 137.
26

Nicholas Horthy, Memoirs. (New York; Robert Speller and Sons,
1957), p. 179. Also see; Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 137.
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A diplomatic flurry followed the Fuehrer's advice and H itler could scarcely
contain both Hungary and Bulgaria from promptly invading the remainder of
Rumania.

27

The Hungarians prepared themselves for armed aggression to regain
their loss of 1919,
and Casky

29

28
On July 10, 1940, Hitler and Ciano received Teleki

and gave them freedom of action in regard to the Rumanian quest-

tion, but Hitler warned the Hungarians that they would receive no aid from
either Germany or Italy in any action they might take.

30

H itler, seeing the

opportunity presented to him, offered to send King Carol a demarche asking him
to acqept negotiations.
. 31
Germany and Rumania.

Carol responded by offering Hitler an alliance between
It was at this point that it became clear that the

whole Transylvanian question was nothing but a bait held out by Germany,
taking advantage of their advantageous position, to entice both Rumania and

27

Russia encouraged the revisionist aims of Hungary in Transylvania

28

.
•
Count Pal Teleki,, Hungarian Prime Minister, February, 1939 to
A pril, 1941.
29

Count Istvan, Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1938 to 1941.

^ H u g h Gibson, (ed.), The Ciano Diaries, 1939-43.
Doubleday and Co •, n c ., 1946), (July 10, 1940), p. 274.
Ol

(New York:

Malcomb Muggeridge, (e d .), Ciano's Diplomatic Papers (London:
Odhams Press, Limited, 1948), p. 381
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Hungary to seek halp from Germany.

32

would emerge as th& ultimate winner.

Regardless of the outcome, Germany
On July 15, 1940, the Fuehrer rejected

Carol's plea for an alliance, telegraphing Carol that Rumania must come to
terms with Hungary.

He also told the King that Germany was not going to

interfere in any Hungarian plans concerning Rumania.

Hitler also stated that

Germany was not interested in helping Rumania, even if it meant that Germany
would have to dispense with Rumanian o i l .

33

The Fuehrer's scheme succeeded.

- Carol submitted to Germany 's demands and sent Manoilescu
H itle r.
,

34

, .
35
and Gigurtu
to

Hitler's decision would guide Rumania as to what course of action she
,

should take.

36

The Fuehrer next moved to settle Bulgaria's disputes with its neighbors,
particularly Rumania.

He approved of Bulgaria's land claims and stated that he

believed that the three Balkan States should come to terms.
act as the mediator between the newly formed bloc of States.

Germany would
37

TL
The discussions

took place in two separate locations: The Rumanians met with Ciano and
Mussolini in Rome, while Hitler met with the Bplgarian leaders at Salzburg.

3^Horthy, p. 325,
33

Survey of International A ffairs, Triumph of the Axis, p. 325.

34

Mihai Manoilescu, Gufenu's successor as Prime Minister a decided
Germanophile
35
36

Don Gigurtu, Rumanian Prime Minister,
Survey of International Affairs, Triumph > p. 325.

37 Ibid.

75

The outcome of the negotiations was the-Second Vienna Award,
August 30, 1940.

38

signed on

Under the terms of this treaty, Northern Transylvania was
39

attached to Hungary.

Hungary now received an areg of 16,642 square

miles with a population of 2, 393,600.

Southern Dpbrubia, which had an area

of some 3,000 square miles, was taken by Bulgaria.

The total amount of land

which Rumania lost was about 20,000 square miles with a population of about
4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .

4 0

*

According to Ciano:

joy when they saw the map.

"The Hungarians couldn't contain their

Then we heard a loud thud.

It was Manoilescu*

41
who fainted on the table ."
In return for Germany's guaranty of the award, Hungary agreed to
step up the delivery of foodstuffs to Germany.
deal from the Vienna Award.
Balkan "War .

42

The Reich gained a great

For one thing, it succeeded in preventing a

In addition, due to the manner in which Transylvania was parti

tioned, Germany succeeded in transferring the major railway line into the more
compliant Hungarian hands.

43

This railway line wqs vital to Germany as it

enabled her to gain a direct route to the Rumanian oil fields.

Lastly, the

3 ^A I so known as the Second Belvedere Award.

Horthy

Szinai and L, Szuce, The Confidential Papers of Admiral
(Budapest: Corvina Press, 1965), p. 132.
^ T h is came to be known as the Treaty of Craiova.
44 Gibson, (Ciano), December 6 , 1940, p. 319.
42
43

M . Szinai and L. Szuce, (Horthy), p. 132.
Survey o f International Affairs, Triumph, p. 325,
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Reich had succeeded in satisfying the greater part o f Bulgaria's revisionist aims.
By the award, Germany gained everything useful while making Hungary play
the role of the wolf.

-Thus^ Germany, in one stroke, gained a hold in all three

capitals, Budapest, Bucharest and Sophia.

44

The situation between the Award

countries relaxed somewhat, as Hungary was resting on the laurels of new acqui
sitions, and Rumania was torn apart internally.
The loss of Transylvania drove King Carol from the throne in favor of
his son, M ic h a e l.

The real power behind the throne was General Antonescu,

the newly appointed Prime M inister.

45

As soon as Antonescu took office, he

publicly proclaimed his intention of using his power to complete the transformation of Rumania into a fascist state to be firmly attached to Germany and Italy.

46

The new Premier wasted no time in following through with his intentions.
Antonescu immediately announced that, henceforth, the pro-totalitarian group,
the Iron Guard, would be the only legal political group or party permitted in
Rumania.

47

In September of 1940, Nazi SS officials began their infiltration

into Rumania under the pretense of assisting in the relocation of Germans leaving
Bessarabia (in case of a Soviet invasion).

In October, German troops openly

44 Ibid., p . 328,
4^ In July of 1940, King Carol had him arrested twice, but appointed
him Premier in the wake of political insurrection,

46’Mclnnis,
|
V o l. I . , p. 262,
47

Lukacs, p. 313.

77
.4 8
occupied Rumania, particularly around the oil fields of Ploesti.

On October 9, von Ribbentrop sent off a message to Moscow to calm
the anxiety there regarding German troop movements in Rumania:
. . . The Rumanian government some time ago made
a request of us to make available to it, for the training
of the Rumanian army, a military mission with certain
instruction units from the German a r m y .^
The purpose of the movement was the necessity of protecting those
interests from Great Britain.

50

General Antonescu asked the German Ministry

in Rumania for
. . . aerial defense of Ploesti (anti-aircraft artillery
and pursuit planes) . . . . The General bases his
request on . . . the dangers to the oil fields which
would be increasingly great as soon as the arrival of
the advance party (instructional units) became known
to England.^
By June of 1940, German penetrqtion into Southeastern Europe with
out outright military take-over reached its limits.

From this point on, qny

German gains would come about only through military occupation.

The successes of the German Army in Western Europe, the Norwegian
Campaign, and the troop movements in the Balkan countries during the first year

^ S u rv e y of International Affairs, Triumph, p. 330,
N azi-Soviet Relations, p, 20$,
50 Ibid,
51 D .Q e r .F .P ., "D", V o l. X . , N o . 151, p. 260.
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of the war, served to whet Mussolini's appetite for a shqre of the limelight,
Italy's success in Albania did little to satisfy Mussolini's expansionist aims.
The Duce had entered the war on June 10, 1940, but the declaration was too
late for him to claim any responsibility for the capitulation of France,

52

The

situation facing Mussolini worsened, as he persistently heard rumors of peace
overtures made to Great Britain by Germany.

53

On June 19, 1940, Hitler and Ribbentrop met with their Italian
counterparts at Munich to discuss armistice terms to be imposed on France,
Mussolini's fears of "being caught in the outbreak of peace" was increased by
Ribbentrop's statement that peace feelers were operating through Swedish channels.

54

Mussolini was fearful of the possibility of an early peace between

Great Britain and Germany, because of intentions concerning France.

As

early as July, the German Ministers in the countries of Western Europe were
sending dispatches to Berlin concerning the British attitude on the continuation
of the war.

On July 22, 1940 Ambassador HempeI

55

wrote:

"Prospects for the continuation of the wqr are generally
regarded with pessimism. While the middle and lower
classes of people are depressed and longing for a speedy
peace, the ruling class is still preponderate!y in favor
of going pn with the war." ^6

^ Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rpme-Berlin Axis, A History of the
Relations Between Hitler and Mussolini (New York: Oxford University Press,
1949), p. 215
^Lukacs, p. 316.
^W iskem ann, p. 216.
Edward Hempel, German Ambassador to Iceland, 1937-1945.
5 6 D .G e r, F .P ., "D", V o l. X . , p. 262.
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If such a peace were achieved, Italy's North African claims against France
might be ignored.

Mussolini began to speak of action against either Greece

or Yugoslavia as early as September.

57

"When German troops began occupying Rumania in defense of the
Ploesti oil fields during the summer of 1940, the Duce was surprised and
angered.

It was at this point that Mussolini decided that Greece was to be

his next sphere of a c tiv ity ,

On October 12, he told Ciano:

"Hitler always faces me with a fait accompli. This
time I am going to pay him back in his own coin.
He will find out from the papers that I have occupied
Greece. In this way, the equilibrium will be
re-established. "5®
The Fuehrer and his Foreign Minister were leaving France on October 27,
59
1940
when they received word of the Italian plans concerning Greece to take
place the following day.

.Hitler immediately ordered Ribbentrop to arrange a

meeting between Mussolini and himself the following day. ^

It was too late.

As German officials emerged from the train the next day, Mussolini gleefqlly
addressed Hitler: "Fuehrer, we are on the march!

Victorious ltdlian troops

^W iskem ann, p. 226.
Gibson, October 12, 1940, p. 300.
59

The two were returning from Montoire, where Petain had signed an
agreement collaborating with Germany towards Great Britain's fa ll. The meet
ing was the second stop in the journey. Hitler had earlier gone t6 Hendaye,
Spaine with hopes of absorbing Franco's forces on the side of the Axis. See:
Shirer, Rise and Fall, pp. 814-16.
^ A la n Bullock,
and Row, 1962), p , 565.

Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper
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crossed the Greco-’Albanian frontier at dawn today.
Indeed they had.

After a three-hour grace in which to answer an

ultimatum, the Greek Prime Minister, Metaxas, said that the ultimatum meant
war.

62

Mussolini's attack on Greece showed the world the most effective
manner in which not to execute a blitzkrieg,

It was doomed from the start.

The time of the year was the poorest choice the Italians could have made.
Lack of planning on the part of the Italians was evident.
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Ciano relied on

cooperation from Bulgaria to render ineffective (against Italy) a large part of
the Greek Army stationed on the Bulgarian border.

Mussolini previously had

had offered to King Boris of Bulgaria the possibility that Bulgaria might be able
to gain an outlet on the Aegean Sea.

64

The Duce also told his pommander-in

chief of the operation, General Bodoglio^ that he had bribed the leading

^ Shirer, p. 816.
zo
° Survey o f International Affairs, Triumph, p. 340. The pretext
of the ultimatum was the non-neutral conduct of the Greeks in allowing British
ships to be repaired and to dock in the Greek inlets and outlets.
^ 3 piefro Ba dogji01 Itqly in the Second World War, Memories and
Documents (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 25.
^ Luigi Vi I lari, Italian Foreign Policy under Mussolini (New Yorkj
The Devin-Adair Company, 1956), p . 273.
A

Badoglio, p, 27. Marshall Pietro Badoglio, Italian Chief of
Staff, H'gh Commissioner of East Africa and Governor General of Lybia.
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Greek generals at a rather high price,

Ciano also surmised, somewhat pre

maturely, that the Albanians would look at Epirus^ as a welcome addition to
their domain and would be excellent fighting companions for Italy.
The Italian Foreign Minister proved to be mistaken on every point.
For one thing, King Boris of Bulgaria did not want an Aegean seaport so badly
that he was willing to wage a war for it.

In the second place, the Greek

generals had not been bought off, as the fierce fighting of the armies under
their leadership illustrated.

Finally, the Albanians' "co-operation" with the

Italians took a form that made themselves more of a nuisance than an a lly .
The comparatively small forces used for the operation, approxi
mately 70,000, suggested that the Italians counted on a prompt Greek collapsed
In the beginning, the Italian coastal drive proved to be moderately successful.
Further inland, owing to poor road conditions, advance and supply became
increasingly difficult.

68

The inability of the Italian forces to move their mechanized divisions
on the muddy roads forced them to use the valleys, giving the Greeks free
reign over the ridges along Italian invasion routes.

Conditions such as this

^ A name given to the land immediately to the south of Albania.
The large number of Albanians in the Greek controlled province made it a tar
get for Albanian expansionist aims.

^

Survey of International Affairs, Triumph, p. 341 .

6 8

Mclnnis, V o l. V . , p. 71.
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were responsible for the catastrophic defeat of the Italian Alpine Divisions on
the Aoos (Viosa) River in early November.

Not only did this battle stop the

Italians cold but it served to give the Greek forces the initiative in the
struggle.^
Adolf Hitler termed the Italian invasion of Greece a "regretable
blunder."

70

It was more than that,

It was the main reason for the forced

military occupation of Southeastern Europe and the eventual Balkan participation in the war.

71

sion immediately.

The O .K .W .

72

realized the effect of the thwarted inva

It meant that the Allies could not be permitted to open an

offensive in the Southeast.

H itler, embarrassed and enraged by the presence

of the British troops in Greece, was particularly concerned about the ease
with which the Allies would be able to stage air raids over the Rumanian oil
fields,

69 Ibid.
^ S h ir e r , p. 817.
^^ Franz von Pqpen, Memoirs (New York: E . P. Dutton and Co .,
In c ., 1953), p. 464.
"""
72

O .K .W . - Ober commando der Wehlmacht or German High

Command.
73

Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1939-45
(New York: Frederick A . Praegor, Publishers, 1964), p. 131.
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Germany now made immediate plans to send troops across Hungary
.7 4 .
75
and Bulgaria
in order to provide reinforcements to the Italian troops.
Mussolini's blunder in Greece also intensified the importance of the war in the
Mediterranean.

On November 12, 1940/ Hitler issued his War Directive N o .

18 in which he outlined his plans for the war in the Mediterranean

With

the Italian venture obviously doomed to failure, the Fuehrer inserted orders
concerning Greece,

" . . . in the event o f its becoming necessary to occupy

that part of the Greek mainland north of the Aegean operating from Bulgaria ."77
On December

6 , 1940,-Field Marshall Erhard M ilch arrived in Rome to begin

plans for an air offensive in the Mediterranean

,:78

The N azi thrust into the Mediterranean spelled the end to whatever
degree of independence the Bqlkan States still maintained.
next country to feel the German strangle-hold.
ing on Operation Marita

79

since November.

Bulgaria was the

The O .K .W , had been workThis plan consisted of forcing

^ T h e advance through Yugoslavia would have been shorter but
Hitler chose not to jeopardize that country's position as neutral.
7 ^ Wilhelm K eitel, The Memoirs of Field Marshall K e ite l.
by W. G arlitz (N ew Y ork: Stein and Day, 1966).

Edited

7^ O riginally, its directives pertained to little else but Operation
Felix, The German code name for the military conquest of Gibralter, the
Spanish Canary Islands, and the Portugese Cape Verde Islands.

77 N . C . A . , V o l. H I., pp. 4 0 3-7 .
7®Gibson, (Ciano), December 6, 1940, p . 319.
7 ^German code name for the invasion of Greece.
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Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact and to transport troops across that
country into Greece by March, 1941.

80

In the first week of 1941, Milan Pilov, Bulgarian Prime Minister,
visited Berlin for decisive discussions with H itler.

King Boris gave him

instructions to consent to what Boris knew the German demands would be:
an avenue for the German Army's march to the Aegean.

81

Forty German

staff officers, "tourists," and German businessmen had entered Bulgaria
during the preceding month,

Bulgarian public opinion was not against a

German-Bulgarian agreement, since an advance on Salonica and Western
Thrace would mean regaining the Aegean outlet lost in 1913.

Bulgaria's

preference of Germany to the Soviet Union was shown by her rejection of a
Soviet proposal for a pact between the two countries, on the grounds that
"accession to it would be abandonment of her neutrality."

83

In a meeting on January 7 , Hitler attempted to ease Bulgaria's
cause for hesitation in entering the Tripartite Pact,

He assured her that

there was only a slim chance that either Turkey or Yugoslavia would attack
Bulgaria over the matter .

As for the danger of Russian intervention, Hitler

88Wiskeman, p. 253,
8 ^ Lukacs, p. 352.

82 Ib id ., p. 358.
83 D .G e r. F .P ., "D ", Vo I . X ., N o . 46B, p . 807.
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stated that such a pact would serve to ally Germany and Bulgaria, Hitler
went on to say that as long as Stalin was a liv e , it was impossible that
Russia would start anything with Germany.

As a proof of this, Hitler

used Rumania as an illustration
The overtures succeeded, because four days later, on January
11, Richthoffen

85

wrote the German Foreign Ministry that:

.
the first conversation which (he) had after
(his) return with the Foreign Minister and the
Minister President today showed that the Bulgarian
Government is at heart prepared to sign the Tripartite
Pact quickly, although apprehensions about military
consequences that might befall between signing o f the
draft pact and the first German aid (still exist),8^
The outcome of the talks with Parvan Dragonov
importance.

87

were of little

Two days earlier, on January 9, the Fuehrer approved von

88

Brauchitsch's

proposal to "get in touch with Bulgaria in order to prepare

quarters for troops south of the Danube for troops crossing first . . ,
expected before the end of January ."

89

84D ,G e r , F . P . , "C", V o l. X , N o . 606, p. 1019.
Or

°Herbert Freiherr von Richthoffen, German Ambassador to
Bulgaria,
D .G e r ,F .P . ,
87

11D", V o l. V , , N o . 648, p, 1080.

Parvan Dragnov, Bulgarian Ambassador to Germany.

8 8 Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief
of the German Army.

89 D .G e r ,F ,P ,, "D", V o l. X I . , N o . 644, p. 1076.

86
On January 28, 1941, Jodi

90

telegraphed Hitler that:

announcement of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite
Pact is no longer urgent . . . the extent of the
(troop) entry cannot yet be predicted at this time,
but w ill most probably not take place before February,

20.91
An agreement was signed between the two countries on February
,9 2
1941, between Field Marshall List
and the Bulgarian General Staff.
agreed to the passage of troops into Bulgaria .

93

8,

It

On February 28, the

Bulgarian Government formally joined the Tripartite Pact, after German
troops crossed the Danube from Rumania the evening before.

94

By the end

of February, only one country separated the German Army from the Aegean
Sea.

The similar fate of Yugoslavia came about much differently.
Great care had to be exercised in case the Italians might interpret any move
made against Yugoslavia as a direct interference with their own interests.
Yugoslavia was the only Balkan country able to supply Italy with the raw

on

General Alfred.Jodi, Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
of the O .K .W ,

91 D .G e r .F .P ., "D", V o l. X I . , N o . 724, p. 1216.
92 Wilhelm List, Commander of the Twelfth Army, at this time was
stationed in Rumania»
93 N X . A . , V o l. IV ., pp, 272-5.

94 Bui lock, p. 583.
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materials that she desperately needed, such as copper, lead, and bauxite.

95

If Yugoslavia were to come under N azi control, Italy's dependence on the
Reich would be increased.

The German victories in Western Europe,

Mussolini feared, might result in drawing Ante Pavelier's
N azi camp.

96

support to the

97

The Italian failures in Greece served to multiply Yugoslavia's
anxieties .

Heretofore, Yugoslavia was important to Germany for only

political and economical reasons.

But now, Germany's relationship with

Yugoslavia began to have military tones.
double jeopardy.

The Yugoslav position was in

Without official sanction, the Yugoslav armaments pro-

ducer, Nikola Stankova,

99

arranged shipments to the Greek army via a

Turkish businessman in Istanbul.
to Greece. ^

98

From there, the armaments were shipped

In addition to this, the Greeks received permission from

Prince Paul to operate and maintain a supply depot in Yugoslav territory.

^ H o p tn e r, p. 173.
^ Ante Pavelier, pro-fascist Croatian leader.
by funds frpm Mussolini.

Supported largely

^ G ib s o n , (Ciano), May 10, 1940, p. 247.
QQ

Primarily since Yugoslavia had asked Germany to make sure
that Italian troops stayed out of Salonika. See; Hoptner, p. 190.
^Fprm er Minister of Finance, pro-Greek and a close friend of
Prince Paul.
Hoptner, p. 191.
101 Ibid.
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In February, Prince Paul told Arthur Lane
position was desperate.

103

102

that Yugoslavia's

With the date of Operation Marita approqch-

ing, Hitler became increasingly aggressive in his overtures to Yugoslavia.
104
On February 15, Hitler conversed with Cvetkovic
andC in car.1 0 5
Markovic
at Berghof.

The talk centered about the danger of

Bolshevist penetration into the Balkans.

The fuehrer also hinted at

Yugoslavia's entrance into the Tripartite Pact and offered Salonika as a
bribe.

106

Yugoslavia rejected the proposal on the grounds that such a

pact would involve both political and military collaboration.

107

In the meantime, the Italians were equally ambitious in their
efforts to regain as much influence in Yugoslavia as possible.

On

108
February 4 , the Duce also offered Salonika as a bait.

102

Paul flatly

United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

^ ^ C o rd e lI Hull, The Memoirs of GordelI Hull
The MacMillan Company, 1948), V o l. I I . , p. 928.

(New York:

104

Dragisha Cvetkovic, Yugoslav Prime Minister, February,
1939 to March, 1941 .
^ “*Aleksandar C inear-Markovic, Yugoslavian Foreign Minister,
February, 1939 to March, 1941 .
106D .G e r .F .P ., "D", V o l. X L , N o . 48, p.
107ploptner, P*

88.

210.

In Mussolini's view, an agreement with Yugoslavia would
hasten Greece's fa ll, and at the same time, would stop German interven
tion which would severely wound Italicin pride.

89

told Mussolini that he would make no agreement with Italy while Italy

109
continued to wage its war on Greece .

On February 25, Prince Paul

informed the Italian Charge d Affaires that he was willing to negotiate
an agreement with Italy, provided that Italian actions did not alienate
public opinion in Yugoslavia against the government,

no

The Germans,

however, interfered in the talks between the two countries on February
22 when the Foreign Ministry ordered:
. . , we wogjd like to suggest that the Italian
government, in case the Yugoslavs should approach it
once more, shoult not go more deeply into the sub
ject in the conversations for the time being and cer
tainly should not consider any sort of agreement until
the result of our negotiations now pending was
certain. ^^ ^
On March 4, Prince Paul paid a secret visit to Hitler at the
Berghof in order to discuss further the possibilities of a German-Yugoslav
Agreement.

112

At the meeting, Hitler granted Paul control of Salonika.

Such an acquisition would have given Yugoslavia an access to the Aegean .
The Fuehrer also vowed that Yugoslavia would not be asked to permit
German troops and supplies to cross its border during the coming Greek

Hoptner, p*. 207.

110 D .G e r .F .P ,, 11D", V o l. X II, N o . 85, p. 158,
111 Ib id ., N o . 97, p. 180.
^ ^ B u llo c k , p. 583.
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hostilities.

H3

On March 24, 1941, the Yugoslav Prime Minister,

Cvetokovic, accompanied by Foreign Minister Cincar-Markovic slipped
•if

114
out of Belgrade

and went to Vienna.

In the presence of Hitler and

Ribbentrop, the pact was signed the following morning.

115

Hitler

closed the meeting yvith a reassuranee of his earlier pledges.

(Even he

did not realize, however, that of all his broken pledges, changing c ir
cumstances destined this to be the shortest Iiv e d .)
It looked as if Yugoslavia, like Rumania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia and Austria, were now under the iron hand of Nazism.
The supposition was b rief.

During the night of March 26 and 27, a

group of Yugoslav officers, fearing their country'? participation in the
Pact, staged a coup d'etat.

116.

There had been an atmosphere of unrest

in Yugoslavia as early as 1937 but it was not until January of 1941 that
. H7
General Dusan Simovic
considered an overthrow warranted.

It pro

vided the only alternative to making complete capitulation of Yugoslavia
to N azi Germany necessary.

118

113D .G e r .F .P ., 11D", X I I . , N o . 130, p. 231.
T14

There existed a fear of kidnap by hostile a n ti-N a z i demon
strators so their exit was held in strictest secrecy.
^ ^ B u llo c k , p. 583,
116 , ,
Ib id ., p. 584.
^^Commander of the Yugoslav Air Force,
'^® R istic, p. 84.
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The actual planning of the Yugoslav coup d1etat was done by
.119
Simonic's assistant, General Broivja~Mirkovic.

After the overthrow,

Cvetkovic and his Foreign Minister, Cincar-Markovic/ were arrested by
the revolutionaries.

120

family left for Greece.

The following night, Prince Paul and his

12!

throne on March 28, 1941.
Prime Minister.

In his place, King Peter ascended the
122

General Simovic then took over as

123

The coup d' etat threw Hitler into one of his wildest rages.
A war council was called at the Chancellery on March 27.

The trouble

in Belgrade endangered both Operations Marita and Barbarossa.

The

Fuehrer ta|d the conference that he had no intention of standing for that:
now he would smash Yugoslavia once and f o r a ll.

Never mind what the

^^H optner, p. 252,
120Dfqgisa N , Ristic, Yugoslavia’s Revolution of 1941
(University Park, Pennsylvania: T he Pennsy I van ia Sta te Un i versi ty
Press, 1966), pp. 95-100.
l ^ Hoptner, p. 266.
1^A ccording to the constitution, it was illegal for him to
take the throne before his eighteenth birthday (September 6, 1941).
See: Ristic, p. 187.
123

It had been suggested, to no avail, that Cincar-Markovic
be retained as Prime Minister, primarily as a move to gain Germany's
trust, at least until the shock of the coup d' etat had time to settle in
Berlin. S e e :; Hoptner, p. 265,
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new government might tell him, he had been disgracefully betrayed and a
declaration of loyalty would only be a feint, to play to win time.

.124

In his rage, Hitler issued "War Directive N o . 25 concerning the
fate of Yugoslavia:
No diplomatic enquiries will be made nor ultimatums
presented . . . the blow against Yugoslavia shall be
pitilessly struck and her military destruction (w ill) be
carried out with lightning speed . ■. . . The war
should be very populqr in Italy, Hungary, ahd Bulgaria
sipce their states might hope to make territorial gains;
for Italy, the Adriatic Coast, the Banat for Hungary,
and Macedonia for Bulgaria . ^2^
The attack was scheduled to begin on April

6 . The day before the attack

Hitler telegraphed to Mussolini and expressed his desire for the postponement
of any Italian military clashes with the Greeks,

Hitler also demanded that

the Italian forces wait for German strategic orders.
Yugoslavia also relied on Hungarign cooperation.
patched General Sztojay

127

126

The plan tp destroy

On March 28, Hitler dis-

to Budapest to convey to Horthy his desire for m ili

tary assistance and to promise (Hungary that she had a chance to fulfill her
128
revisionist aims,

This placed the Hungarians in a pred icament.

124K eitel, p. 138,
125

N . C . A , , V o l. V I r , pp. 938-9.

^26<W iskemann, p. 256.
127

Dome Sztojay, Hungarian Foreign Minister to Germany.

128D .G er.F.P ., "D” , V o l. X I I . , N o . 215, p. 369,
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Hungary had allowed passage o f German troops through her country while
enroute to Rumania,

Now Germany wqs not only asking Hungary's permission

for transit rights, but was pressuring her to take an active part in the attack on
Yugoslavia, fully realizing that Hungary had just concluded q pqct of friend129
ship with Yugoslavia four weeks before.

The Hungarian Prime Minister,

Pal Teleski, could not bring himself to suppprt such a move,
out of his dilemma, he committed suicide on April 3, 1941 ,

As the only way

130

In a letter to

Hitler on that same date,H orthy expressed his desire to cooperate with the
Germans qnd listed the military measures which had already been adopted by
the country.

The Regent was, however, of the opinion that mobilization would

not be completed until April 15 but that operations could be carried out as early
as the

12th.

131

Operation Punishment
on April

6,

132

began with a ruthless bombing of Belgrade

The New York Times reported that bombing missions at roof-top

heights (for Belgrade had no anti-aircraft guns) killed 17,000 civilians in three

129

Horthy, Memoirs, p. 183,

130
/
D iG er ;F.:P., "D", V o l, X I I . , N o . 261, p. 447,
The Times (London), ApriT 4, 1941.
^^ Szinqi and Szuce, (Horthy), p, 177.
"D ", V o l. X I I . , p. 306, p. 509.

See also:

See also; D .G e r ,F .P .,

132
Hitler's special code name for the Yugoslav invasion.
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days.

1 3 3

A

The Yugoslav Army did not have time to mobilize byt gathered

hastily to defend its country against the onslaught’ of German troops.

Poorly

equipped, deployed, and organized, it offered little resistance to the
■Wehlmacht.

Yugoslavia, divided by Croatian and Yerbian factions, also

lacked political unity.

This thwarted any attempt towards military unity and

hastened the collapse of the Army.

134

On its drive to Belgrade, the German

Army captured 15,000 soldiers, including 22 generals ,

By the end of the twelfth

day of fhe Yugoslav campaign, approximately 254,000 Yugoslav soldiers fell
into German hands.
)ds.
tional surrender.

135

On April 17, C incar -Markov ic signed the uncondi

136

The armistice was really a document that provided the blueprint for
the termination of Yugoslavia's political existence as a monarchy.

Germany

137
received the Slovine territories of Maribor and C e lje .

She also maintained

full authority over the Banat, which was intended later to serve as the core of a

133New York Times, April 7 , 1941.
^3^Hoptner, p. 287.

135 Ibid.
1^
Cincar-/Vktrkovic signed thearmistice because no responsible head
of the Yugoslav Revolutionary Government still remained in the country. See:
Hoptner, pp. 288-92.

136
in 1919.

This included the territory that Yugoslavia received from Austria

95
German Sudgau.

138

The Reich also maintained full contrpl over Serbia

which was put under the control o f the Serbian Fascist General Lyotic.
Italy's claims to the dismembered country were treated on the same
139
level as the rest of the satellite countries.
She received the southern part
o f Slovenia and part of the Dalmatian seacoast from Split to the Albanian
border, and was appointed as the protector of Montenegro f
kingdom had lasted less than two decades.

The Yugoslavian

By mid-April, 1941, it ceased to

exist as a political entity.
The military occupation of Yugoslavia was notan isolated incident.
Germany began its Operation Marita at the same time as it began its Operation
Punishment.

Operation Marita began on April

6 when German troops crossed

14°
into Greece from Bulgaria .
The plans for the invasion of Greece were not made with the same
wrath as the plans fpr the invasion of Yugoslavia had been.

Kietel wrote that

Hitler:
was basically minded to give the Greeks an honourable
settlement in recognition of their brave struggle and

Sudgau was the term used for a proposed German colony on the
lower Danube made up of German-inhabited districts of Tolna in Hungary and
the Backa, together with the Banat.
^^B ullock, p. 586.
Survey of International Affairs, Triumph, p. 361.

o f their blamelessness for this war; after a ll, the
Italians had started i t , ^
Hitler was later to say that the campaign in Greece was not directed
against the Greeks per se; nor was it directed toward the purpose of rescuing
his Italian A llies, but it was undertaken solely as a precaution against a
British attempt to entrench themselves in the Balkans.

142

The immediate task,

however, was the expulsion of British troops from Greece.
On March 4 , Sir Anthony Eden^^ and General 0111
with Prime Minister Korizis

145

arranged

that British aid should be sent to Greece.

This

aid consisted of the British First Armoured Brigade, the New Zealand Division,
and the Sixth Australian Division.

The Polish Brigade and the Seventh

Australian Division were to follow by the end of the month,

146

On April 5 , the German Foreign Ministry telegraphed its intentions
to the legqtion in Athens.

141

The cablegram also included Germany's justification

K eitel, p. 141.

^ ^B ullock, p. 585.
143

British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

^ ^ C h ie f o f the -Imperial British General S ta ff.
145Alexander Korizis, Greek Prime Minister from January 29 to
April 18, 1941, replacing Metaxas who did in early January, 1941. He was
decidedly more Germanophile than Metaxas.
146

Churchill, Memoirs, p. 426.
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for the occupation.

The Reich, in possession of "documentary evidence"

charged that:
. .. . These documents point out that the Greek
Government . . » concerning whose unneutral ponduct
since the beginning of the war . . . by permitting strong
English forces to enter the country has itself brought on
a situation towards which Germany can no longer remain
inactive. The Reich government has therefore now ordered
its troops to expel the British forces from Greek soil. Any
resistance offered to the Wehrmacht w ill be ruthlessly
crushed . , . it is emphasized that the German troops do
not come as enemies of the Greek people and that the
German people have no intention o f fighting or destroying
the Greek people as such. Rather the blow which Germqny
is compelled to strike on Greek territory is aimed at
England. ^47
On April

6, Field Marshall List, Commander of the German Twelfth

Army which consisted of fifteen divisions (four of them armoured) crossed into
Greece.

The Greeks, exhausted after six months of fighting with the Italians,

offered only a token resistance .

Prime Minister Korizis committed suicide and

the nation's leadership fell into the hands of the Army.
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On April 20, the

Greek generals in Epirus and Macedonia offered capitulation to the advancing
Germans.

General Tsolakoglu, commander of the Epirus army, made a deal

with the Germans behind the backs of the Italians in order to save Epirus from
,
149
Mussolini.

147D .G e r .F .P ., "D", V o l. X I I , , N o , 274, p. 465.
148

Survey o f International Affairs, Triumph, p.

^4^Lukacs, p. 384.
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On April 21, the Greeks informed the British that continued struggle
against the Germans was pointless.
Wilson

152

15°

General Papagos

151

.
told General

that in order to prevent the devastation of Greece, British troops

should re-embark,
On the 23rd of A p ril, the Greek Government temporarily evacuated
154
to Crete, and four days later the German Army entered Athens,

It was

another example, as Churchill wrote, of "One at a Time" of Germany's policy
towards the Balkans.
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The Greeks, as in the case of Yugoslavia, stood helplessly by and
watched the division of their country.

General Tsolakogulu was placed in

charge of forming a government to accept the German terms.
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As a result of the Greek occupation , Bulgaria recovered’Western
Thrace, Eastern Macedonia and the regions of Florine and Kastoria, lost fo

150
151

Survey of International Affairs, Triumph, p . 362.
Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army.

152.
Field Marshal Sir Henry M aitland, Supreme Commander of the
Mediterranean
153
154

Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 225.
Survey of International Affairs, Triumph, p. 362,

^ ^ C h u rc h ill, Memoirs, p . 429.

156Gibson, (Ciano), April 27, 1941, p. 343.
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her since 1919.

157

Germany maintained direct control over Salonika.

158

The Fuehrer brushed Mussolini's claims of Salonika aside by saying that
Bulgaria had requested it earlier and had received German approval.

In

159
doing so, the Reich preserved the area for military intentions.

Thus, the

last country in Southeastern Europe had joined the vast N azi hinterland.

^^Lukacs, p. 384.
158

The area was entrusted to General Lehr's administration.
was to be used as a military center for Eastern operations,
159

Survey of International Affairs, Triumph, p . 362.
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CHAPTER V I

C ONCLUSIONS

Operations Punishment and Marita began simultaneously on April
1941.

6,

The occupation of the two countries, Yugoslavia and Greece, resulted

in the complete loss of independence by the Balkan States.
had occurred as early as 1938.

In actuality, that

Practically speaking, it began soon after

Hitler ascended to power in 1933.
This paper has dealt with the gradual encirclement of Southeastern
Europe by N azi Germany.

There are numerous reasons why the Reich was

unimpeded in its Balkan penetration.

The first, and most important of these

reasons must lie with the Western democracies' inability (or unwillingness) to
offer economic assistance to Southeastern Europe.

This forced the individual

Balkan nations to rely more and more on the Third Reich.
As the depression slowly came to an end, the nations of the world
adopted a fiercely nationalistic and protective attitude to stimulate their
domestic economies.
possible.

The standard policy called for as little importation as

Here again was a factor that aided Germany in its early stages of

penetration.

The Reich was a heavy importer of foodstuffs and exporter of

finished goods.

The Balkan countries relied almost solely on exportation of

goodstuffs and had to import nearly a ll their finished goods.
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Hence, from the
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beginning, a mutual attraction -developed.

With the closing of the world

markets to the Southeastern European countries, they willingly accepted the
generous proposals offered by the Reich.
The rearmament policy in Germany and the hesitancy of the Western
democracies to enforce the provisions of the Versailles Treaty enticed the
Balkans into the German camp.

The weaknesses shown by France, Great

Britain and the United States served to induce the countries of Southeastern
■Europe to lean to the Reich.

The growing strength of N azi Germany was at

first used as a bargaining power in Southeastern Europe.
as a threat to the Balkans' very independence.

St soon revealed itself

As the fascist regime grew

bolder In its defiance towards the'West, the lack of the latter's response
illustrated the futility of the Balkans expecting assistance from Western Europe
and the United States.

Southeastern.Europe also began to see Its own immedi

ate danger were it to fall in disfavor with H itler.
The German modus operand! concerning the Balkans, although
involving a complicated system of economic devices, was simple: gain a
ready access to easy credit and accumulate large debts.

In this way, the only

manner by which the creditor nations could hope to realize a return would be
to accept any and all products the Reich exported to them.

Germany, in turn,

found a source of steady supply for its foodstuff requirements and, also, had an
outlet for products that had little demand on the world market.
The vast Industrialization of Germany resulted in an acute shortage
of oil in the Reich.

From 1936 onward, the Ploesti oil fields of Rumania
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affected Germany's entire policy toward Southeastern Europe.

Aside from

economic value, the Balkans began to have a strategic importance to the N azi
hierarchy.

Guaranty of the priceless commodity became the primary factor

in the Reich's involvement with Southeastern Europe.

It Is here that the fate

of Southeastern Europe was sealed.
The Anschluss and the occupation of Czechoslovakia placed the
Reich in direct proximity to the Balkans.

By that time, Southeastern Europe

was almost wholly dependent economically on N azi Germany.

Utilizing

’Western hesitancy as a trump card, Reich diplomats pressed for troop move
ments throughout the Balkan area .
'With the outbreak of the war, it became necessary for Germany to
consolidate Southeastern Europe; not only to insure the safety of its oil and
other supplies, but to protect itself from the possibility of the Allies opening
upaSoutheastern front.

In doing this, the N azi diplomats played on the very

weakness of the Balkan States themselves; the bitterness among the States
caused by the post “World War I peace settlements.

Courting the individual

revisionist appetites of these States, the Reich succeeded in bringing the
countries under her direct control.
- Germany also used the inherent Balkan fear of the Soviet Union to
its awn advantage.

The proximity of the Russian menace to Southeastern Europe

(especially to Rumania) facilitated N azi intervention in Balkan affairs.

After

the N azi-Soviet Pact in 1939, Balkan diplomats openly soqght the Reich's
guarantee of their independence in the event of Russian aggression .
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Two events resulted in the outright military occupation of South
eastern Europe,

The first was an erratic attempt by Italy to realize her own

expansionist aims in Greece,
Yugoslavia.

The second was a military coup d‘ etat in

These, added to the presence of A llied troops in Greece, resul

ted in an overt military campaign into the Balkans.
Though the gradual, total subjugation of the Balkans encompassed
eight years, the result was the same.

As of June, 1941, Rumania, Bulgaria,

Greece, and Yugoslavia were added to an impressive list that included
Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and France
a s satte I i tes o f the Th i r d Re i c h.
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The era of N azi power in Germany is one of the most written about
periods in history.

Because of this, there is no problem in accumulating a

large number of secondary sources containing information on the Third Reich.
It was also fortunate that several excellent books have been published which
concentrate on the manner and methods which the N azi hierarchy used to
finance their rise to military greatness.

Some of these books are: Sweezy!s

The Structure of the N az i Economy, Vaso,Trivanovitch's Economic Develop
ment of Germany under National Social ism, Gustaf Sto 1per1s The German
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Economy, 1870 to the Present, and Burton H . Klein's Germany's Economic
Preparation for W a r .

Of these books, Maxine Sweezy's must rate as the

best, not only for its thoroughness but also because of its extensive biblio
graphy and references.

Another secondary source vital to the research for

this paper is S «E. Harris's Exchange Depreciation.

This is a complicated

book but is extremely valuable if one is to understand the problems raised by
currency fluctuation and exchange controls.
•For general background information on data concerning the Third
Reich, two books are indispensable.

These books are; H itler, A Study in

Tyranny by Alan Bullock and its offspring,
Reich by William Shirer.

The Rise and Fall of the Third

These books give the reader an extensive insight

into the era and present an excellent springboard for further research.
■Survey of International Affairs also gives one a never ending supply of infor
mation.

These volumes, published by the Royal Institute of International

Affairs acquaint the researcher with every aspect of European events of the
era.
The most valuable books dealing with the Balkan States were L.S.
Stavrianos1The Balkans Since 1453, and Kerner and Howard's The Balkan
Entente 1930-35.

These sources offered a tremendous amount of extensive,

detailed and well researched information.
There were several books that proved to be very useful in providing
information on Germany's economic encroachment into Southeastern Europe.
Antonin Basch's work, The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere
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is very thorough in its coverage of the Reich's advance into the Balkans.
Basch's work, combined with Schacher's Germany Pushes Southeast pro
vided the general outline for this paper.

These books were filled with sta

tistics, tables and bibliographical aids, and proved to be indispensable to
the paper's research.
For a very brilliant and involved analysis of Dr. Schacht's manner
of penetration into the Balkans, Amos E. Simpson's treatise, Hjalmar
Schacht in Perspective, is excellent.

This book was not only informative

and useful in itself but its documentation provided a sound basis for further
research.
As the research began to involve itself more and more around the
military aspect, several secondary sources became extremely useful, in
addition to the ones already cited.

Elizabeth Wiskemann's The Rome-

Berlin Axis was useful in the research on the problems concerning
Yugoslavia.

J.B. Hoptner's highly documented Yugoslavia in Crisis,

1934-41 was indispensable in that area.

James E .-McSherry in his Sta I in,

Hitler and Europe, 1933-39 strengthened the arguments for Russia's growing
interest In the Balkans.
The Great Powers and Eastern Europe by John A , Lukacs was one of
the best sources dealing with inter-Balkan conflicts and their problems with
the Great Powers.

Highly documented, M r. Lukacs' work presented perhaps

the most extensive and all inclusive secondary source of the bibliography.
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"Germany's Trade Offensive; German Methods of Foreign Trade."
The Economist, C X X X V II, N o . 133 (November 5, 1938), p. 262.
"Great Germany and Southeastern Europe ."
131 (May 14, 1938), p. 355.
" Danubia's Dilemma . "
1938), p. 354.

The Economist, C X X X I, No .

The Economist, C X X X IV , N o . 132 (August 20,

The bound volumes of The Economist obtained from the University of
Nebraska are the most valuable periodicals referred to in the research of this
paper.

The articles, while not only concurring with the intentions of this
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thesis, also gave the researcher a never ending supply of statistics, tables
and other valuable data.

5.

Newspapers

The Times (London).
New York Times.

April 1-8, 1941.

April 1—8, 1941.

The value of a newspaper in research to an author is highly ques
tionable except for providing general background information.

Too often

editors seem to distort, exaggerate or otherwise "tamper" with information
to make it more attractive to this subscribers.

